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C lear	and	distinct	perception	is	the centerpiece	of	Descartes’s	philosophy.	It	is	uniquely	indubitable	and	uniquely	infalli-ble.	It	is	the	one	and	only	source	of	certain	knowledge.	It	is	
normatively	required	for	assent	in	a	priori	disciplines	like	metaphysics,	
mathematics,	 and	 logic:	 you’re	 not	 supposed	 to	 assent	 to	 a	 proposi-
tion	unless	you	perceive	it	clearly	and	distinctly.	Descartes	designed	
an	early	work,	 the	 Rules,	 to	help	 readers	 “acquire	 the	habit	of	 intuit-
ing	the	truth	distinctly	and	clearly”	(AT	10:400–1).1	Likewise,	the	chief	
purpose	of	his	masterpiece,	the	Meditations,	is	to	teach	readers	how	to	
perceive	things	clearly	and	distinctly.	As	he	writes	to	Mersenne:	“We	
have	to	form	distinct	ideas	of	the	things	we	want	to	judge	about,	and	
this	 is	 what	 most	 people	 fail	 to	 do	 and	 what	 I	 have	 mainly	 tried	 to	
teach	by	my	Meditations”	(AT	3:272).	
Most	interpreters	recognize	that	clear	and	distinct	perception	plays	
the	 psychological	 and	 epistemic	 roles	 listed	 above.	 There	 is	 broad	
agreement,	in	other	words,	about	what	clear	and	distinct	perception	
does.	Much	more	vexed	is	the	question	of	what	it	is.	What	does	Des-
cartes	mean	by	the	terms	‘clear’	and	‘distinct’	(and	by	their	antonyms	
‘obscure’	and	‘confused’)?
It	is	often	suggested	that	Descartes	offers	no	real	guidance	on	this	
question	and	that	it	remains	a	kind	of	interpretive	enigma.	More	than	
one	commentator	has	quipped	that	Descartes’s	“concept	of	clear	and	
distinct	perception	is	the	least	clear	and	distinct	concept	in	his	philos-
ophy”	(Markie	1992:	161),	that	“the	notion	of	a	clear	and	distinct	idea	is,	
unfortunately,	one	of	Descartes’	least	clear	and	distinct	notions”	(Della	
Rocca	2002:	74),	or	that	“it	does	not	seem	he	ever	bothers	to	get	clear	
on	clarity	and	distinctness”	(Shapiro	2008:	28).	A	recent	reference	en-
try	on	the	topic	ends	by	calling	for	a	new	account.2 
1.	 For	 Descartes’s	 works,	 I	 refer	 (by	 volume	 and	 page	 number)	 to	 the	 Adam	
and	Tannery	(AT)	edition	of	the	original.	I	generally	quote	from	the	standard	
translation	(CSM[K]).	I	use	(*)	to	indicate	when	I	have	altered	the	translation	
or	provided	my	own.	I	use	(†)	to	indicate	when	I	have	added	italics	or	boldface.	
2.	 “[A]	more	general	account	of	clarity	and	distinctness	is	still	required” (Schmaltz	
2015:	76).
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quality,	and	then	in	§4	I	offer	five	textual	arguments	to	show	that	this	
is	in	fact	Descartes’s	view.	In	§5,	I	explain	how	Descartes	defines	ob-
scurity,	confusion,	and	distinctness	in	terms	of	clarity.	I	conclude	in	§6.
Altogether,	Descartes	views	clarity	as	a	primitive	phenomenal	qual-
ity	which	is	definitionally	prior	to	the	other	perceptual	qualities.	In	a	
slogan:	Clarity	First.
1. Preliminaries
1.1 Relational Properties of Clear and Distinct Perception
Let’s	begin	by	registering	some	well-known	points	about	what	a	per-
ception	is,	for	Descartes,	and	what	roles	a	perception	plays	when	it	is	
clear	and	distinct.
What	Descartes	calls	a	‘perception’	or	‘idea’	is	a	mental	state	with	
intentional	content;	it	is	of or	about things	(AT	7:37,	44).	Perceptions	are	
not	limited	to	the	senses:	they	can	be	sensory,	imaginative,	or	purely	
intellectual	(due	to	pure	reason,	the	intellect,	or	understanding).	The	
term	 ‘perception’	 refers	 to	 the	 act	of	perceiving.	The	 term	 ‘idea’	 can	
also	refer	to	the	act	of	perceiving,	but	it	more	often	refers	to	the	object 
of	perception,	the	thing	perceived,	and	so	that	is	how	I	use	it	here.3
A	perception	 is	not	by	 itself	a	belief	or	 judgement;	 it	merely	pro-
vides	 the	 content	 for	 a	 possible	 judgement	 (AT	 7:37,	 56;	 AT	 8A:17).	
The	will	responds	to	(the	content	of)	a	perception	either	by	assenting	
to	it	as	true	(forming	a	judgement)	or	by	withholding	assent	(suspend-
ing	judgement	in	a	state	of	doubt)	(AT	7:37).
3.	 “I	have	frequently	pointed	out	that	I	use	the	term	‘idea’	to	apply	to	what	is	es-
tablished	by	reasoning	as	well	as	anything	else	that	is	perceived	in	any	man-
ner	whatsoever”	(AT	7:185).	“I	make	it	quite	clear	in	several	places	throughout	
the	book,	and	in	this	passage	in	particular,	 that I	am	taking	the	word	 ‘idea’	
to	refer	to	whatever	is	immediately	perceived	by	the	mind	[quod immediate a 
mente percipitur]” (AT	7:181).	One	way	of	understanding	the	relation	between	
perceptions	 and	 ideas	 is	 offered	 by	 Descartes’s	 disciple	 Antoine	 Arnauld,	
who	writes,	“I	take	perception	and	idea	to	be	one	and	the	same.	Nonetheless	
…	this	thing,	although	single,	stands	in	two	relations:	one	to	the	soul	which	it	
modifies,	the	other	to	the	thing	perceived	…	and	the	word	‘perception’	more	
directly	indicates	the	first	relation;	the	word	 ‘idea’,	 the	latter	relation”	(2011	
[1775]:	198).	For	more	on	Arnauld’s	take,	see	Pearce	(2016).
Other	 interpreters	 venture	 to	 explicate	 the	 nature	 of	 clarity	 and	
distinctness.	They	generally	recognize	that	Descartes	defines	distinct-
ness	 in	 terms	 of	 clarity:	 a	 distinct	 perception	 “contains	 within	 itself	
only what is clear”	(Pr. i.45†).	Where	scholars	disagree	—	the	crux	of	the	
debate	—	is	about	what	it	means	for	a	perception	to	be	clear.	
According	to	the	prevailing	approach,	what	it	means	for	a	percep-
tion	to	be	clear	is	that	its	content	has	a	certain	objective	property,	like	
truth. I	argue	instead	that	clarity	is	a	subjective,	phenomenal	quality	
whereby	a	content	is	presented as true	to	the	perceiving	subject.	Sense-
perception	and	imagination	can	be	clear	to	varying	degrees	which	are	
fallible:	what	is	presented	as	true	might	be	false.	But	in	the	special	case	
of	completely	clear	intellectual	perception,	what	is	presented	as	true	
must	be true.
Like	 phenomenal	 qualities	 in	 general,	 clarity	 is	 (epistemically)	
primitive	in	the	sense	that	we	cannot	come	to	understand	what	clarity	
is	by	analyzing	it	or	defining	it	in	terms	of	other	properties.	Instead,	we	
come	to	understand	what	clarity	is	by	reflecting	on	examples,	within	
our	own	experience,	of	clarity	itself.	
In	addition	to	my	main	claim	about	the	primitive,	phenomenal	na-
ture	of	clarity,	 I	develop	a	secondary	claim	about	 the	natures	of	 the	
other	perceptual	qualities	Descartes	identifies:	obscurity,	distinctness,	
and	confusion.	All	three	of	these	qualities,	I	argue,	are	defined	in	terms	
of	clarity.	Obscurity	is	the	absence	of	clarity	in	a	perception.	Confusion 
is	 the	 condition	 whereby	 one	 perception	 is	 fused	 with	 another	 in	 a	
way	that	makes	it	less clear.	Distinctness, the	opposite	of	confusion,	is	
the	condition	whereby	a	clear	perception	is	“sharply	separated”	from	
anything	obscure	so	that	it’s	completely clear.	That	last	point	is	worth	
emphasizing:	distinctness	is	not	a	further	feature	to	be	added	to	clarity.	
A distinct perception is just a completely clear perception. 
Here	is	the	plan:	In	§1,	I	lay	out	some	basic	points	about	Descartes’s	
appeal	to	clear	and	distinct	perception.	In	§2,	I	expose	problems	for	the	
dominant	 interpretation,	 which	 attempts	 to	 analyze	 clarity	 (and	 dis-
tinctness)	in	terms	of	an	objective	property	of	intentional	content,	like	
truth.	In	§3,	I	explain	the	alternative	view	that	clarity	is	a	phenomenal	
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object	or	content	of	a	clear	and	distinct	perception	unless	it	is	real	or	
true.	Commentators	refer	to	this	claim	as	“the	Truth	Rule”.	
Third,	clear	and	distinct	perception	is	necessary	for	apprehending	
truths	with	certainty:	“A	perception	which	can	serve	as	the	basis	for	a	
certain	and	indubitable	judgement	needs	to	be	not	merely	clear	but	
also	distinct”	(Pr.	i.44,	AT	8A:21–2;	cf.	AT	7:145,	146).
Fourth,	clear	and	distinct	perception	is	not	only	necessary	but	also	
sufficient	for	certain	apprehension	of	truths.	The	authors	of	the	Second 
Set of Objections to the Meditations	read	Descartes	as	holding	that	one	
must	apprehend	God	in	order	to	apprehend	anything	else.	But	this	is	
a	misreading,	as	Descartes	explains	in	reply:	
The	fact	that	an	atheist	can	“clearly	apprehend	[clare cog-
noscere]	that	the	three	angles	of	a	triangle	are	equal	to	two	
right	angles”	is	something	I	do	not	dispute	…	(2O/R, AT 
7:141*)
If	you’re	an	atheist,	you	can	still	perceive	truths	clearly	and	distinctly,	
you	cannot	help	but	assent	to	them	when	you	do,	and	the	judgement	
you	 thereby	 form	 constitutes	 what	 Descartes	 calls	 cognitio	 of	 those	
truths.	As	 it	was	used	 in	ordinary	Latin,	 cognitio could	be	 translated	
as	 ‘knowledge’,	 but	 Descartes	 often	 prefaces	 it	 with	 adjectives	 like	
‘clear’,	 ‘evident’,	 and	 ‘certain’	 to	 remind	 us	 that	 he	 is	 speaking	 of	 an	
epistemic	achievement,	characterized	by	certainty,	which	is	more	de-
manding	than	what	we	might	ordinarily	call	‘knowledge’.	To	forestall	
the	hasty	assumption	that	cognitio is	ordinary	knowledge,	I	render	as	
‘apprehension’.7 
that	the	will	assents	“without	fail”	(i.e.	inevitably)	to	clear	perception.	He	says	
that	“the	will	of	a	thinking	thing	is	drawn	infallibly	[infallibiliter],	to	a	clearly	
known	good”	(2O/R, AT	7:166*),	and	that	“seeing	very	clearly	what	one	must	
do,	one	does	it	infallibly	[infailliblement]”	(To	Mesland,	2	May	1644,	AT	4:117*).	
Thus,	Descartes’s	use	of	‘infallible’	is	closer	to	my	use	of	‘indubitable’	above.	I	
thank	an	anonymous	referee	for	pressing	me	to	clarify	this.	
7.	 Descartes	 goes	 on	 to	 explain	 that	 clear	 and	 distinct	 perception	 is	 not	 suf-
ficient	 for	 the	highest	grade	of	knowledge,	namely	scientia,	which	 requires	
cognitio of	God.	On	Descartes’s	distinction	between	cognitio and	scientia, see	
Carriero	(2008,	2009),	Christofidou	(2012:	182–6),	Cottingham	(1986),	Della	
The	content	of	a	perception	can	be	designated	with	a noun-phrase	
(e.g.	I	have	a	perception	or	idea	of the sun)	or	a	sentential	complement	
expressing	a	proposition	(e.g.	I	perceive	that the sun is round).	For	Des-
cartes,	this	is	merely	a	verbal	difference:	we	may	choose	to	speak	ei-
ther	way,	depending	our	purposes.4	As	we’ll	see,	rival	interpretations	
are	often	formulated	only	with	noun-phrase	constructions,	as	accounts	
of	what	it	means	to	have	a	clear	and	distinct	perception	or	idea	of x. But	
as	Descartes	recognizes,	we	need	propositional	formulations	in	order	
to	specify	exactly	what	it	is	about	x —	which	proposition(s)	—	are	being	
perceived	clearly	and	distinctly	in	a	given	instance.	For	example,	when	
the	 meditator	 first	 comes	 to	 have	 a	 clear	 and	 distinct	 perception	 of 
herself	through	the	cogito argument	in	Meditation	Two,	she	perceives	
clearly	 and	 distinctly	 that she	 exists,	 without	 perceiving	 clearly	 and	
distinctly	 that she	 is	 ‘really	 distinct’	 from	 her	 body.	 Descartes	 is	 em-
phatic	that	the	latter	claim	isn’t	established	until	Meditation	Six	(AT 
7:	8,	27,	129–32,	175,	355–6).	So	we	need	to	use	propositional	formula-
tions,	as	Descartes	himself	does,	to	be	suitably	specific.
When	a	perception	is	clear	and	distinct,	it	plays	key	epistemic	roles.	
First,	 clear	 and	 distinct	 perception	 is	 indubitable:	 “The	 nature	 of	 my	
mind	is	such	that	I	cannot but assent	to	these	things,	at	least	so	long	as	
I	clearly	perceive	them”	(AT	7:65).5	So	long	as	you	perceive	p clearly	
(and	distinctly),	you	cannot	doubt	p,	cannot	help	but	 judge	that	p is	
true. 
Second,	clear	and	distinct	perception	 is	 infallible: “whatever	 I	per-
ceive	clearly	and	distinctly	is	true”	(AT	7:35).6	Something	cannot	be	the	
4.	 When	Mersenne	asks	Descartes	about	whether	the	contents	of	ideas	should	
be	expressed	 “as	 terms	or	propositions”,	Descartes	 replies:	 “I	do	not	under-
stand	your	question	whether	our	ideas	are	expressed	by	a	single	term.	Words	
are	human	inventions,	so	one	can	always	use	one	or	several	to	express	the	
same	thing.	But	I	explained	in	my	Reply	to	the	First	Objections	how	a	triangle	
inscribed	in	a	square	can	be	taken	as	a	single	idea	or	as	several”	(AT	3:	417–8;	
cf.	AT	3:395).	This	point	has	been	noted	by	others:	e.g.	Gewirth	(1943:	n.	5),	
Nelson	(1997:	n.	23),	and	Simmons	(2012:	n.	17).
5.	 Cf.	AT	7:39,	58;	AT	3:64,	147.
6.	 Cf.	AT	7:62,	65,	70.	I	am	using	 ‘infallible’	 in	our	contemporary	sense	of	the	
term.	Descartes	himself	uses	the	term	(in	its	adverbial	form:	‘infallibly’)	to	say	
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as	lively	and	vivid	[vives & expresses]	as	in	waking	life,	or	more	so”	(AT 
6:40*).	So	sense-perception	and	imagination	can	be	very	clear	(lively,	
vivid).11 
Some	commentators	maintain	that	although	sense-perception	can	
be	clear,	it	cannot	be	distinct.	But	again,	Descartes	says	otherwise.	To-
ward	the	end	of	the	Meditations,	Descartes	has	the	meditator	recall	that,	
when	she	began,	“the	ideas	perceived	by	the	senses	were	much	more	
lively	and	vivid	[vividae & expressae]	and	even,	in	their	own	way,	more	
distinct [suo modo distinctae]”	(M6, AT	7:75*)	than	the	intellectual	ideas	
that	she	only	dimly	glimpsed	through	her	fledgling	efforts	in	medita-
tion.	A	few	pages	later:	“I	distinctly	see	where	things	come	from	and	
where	and	when	they	come	to	me”	(M6, AT	7:90).	And	in	the	First	Re-
plies:	“If	we	fix	our	gaze	on	some	part	of	the	sea	at	close	quarters,	then	
our	view	can	be	clear	and distinct,	just	as	our	picture	of	a	chiliagon	can	
be,	if	it	is	confined	to	one	or	two	of	the	sides”	(AT	7:113;	cf.	AT	10:400–
1).	 In	 the	 Second	 Replies	 he	 says	 that	 “someone	 with	 jaundice	 sees	
snow	as	yellow	…	just as clearly and distinctly	as	we	see	it	as	white”	(AT 
7:145†).	Compare	his	remarks	on	imagination:	“We	can	distinctly	imag-
ine	a	lion’s	head	on	a	goat’s	body”	(Discourse	iv,	AT	6:40†).	He	says	that	
“quantity	…	is	something	I	distinctly	 imagine”	(AT	7:63†),	and	speaks	
of	“the	distinct	idea	of	corporeal	nature	which	I	find	in	my	imagination”	
(AT	7:73†).	So,	Descartes	holds	that	sense-perception	and	imagination	
can	be	not	only	clear	but	also	distinct.
This	may	be	surprising.	Isn’t	Descartes	famously	a	Rationalist	who	
holds	that	clear	and	distinct	perception,	as	the	source	of	certainty,	is	
limited	 to	 pure	 reason	 (intellect,	 understanding)?	 The	 key	 to	 under-
standing	what	is	going	on	here	is	that	clarity	and	distinctness	are	both	
scalar;	they	come	in	degrees.	Each	act	of	perceiving	(whether	sensory,	
imaginative,	or	intellectual)	falls	somewhere	on	the	continuum	from	
the	clearest	to	the	most	obscure.	Sense-perception	can	be	“very	clear”	
and	 “in	 its	 own	 way	 distinct”.	 The	 same	 is	 true	 of	 imagination.	 But	
noting	various	things	he	seems	to	see	and	feel,	he	proclaims,	“All	this	would	
not	happen	with such distinctness	to	someone	asleep!”	(AT	7:19†).
11.	 Cf.	AT	7:83,	145;	AT	8A:33.
What	 we’ve	 enumerated	 so	 far	 are	 relational	 properties	 of	 clear	
and	distinct	perception.	Infallibility	is	a	relation	that	clear	and	distinct	
perception	bears	to	reality:	 it	always	represents	reality	accurately.	In-
dubitability	is	a	relation	that	clear	and	distinct	perception	bears	to	the	
will:	 it	always	impels	the	will’s	assent.	And	the	assent	thus	impelled	
always	constitutes	apprehension.	While	these	points	tell	us	what	clear	
and	distinct	perception	does,	it	remains	to	be	seen	what	clear	and	dis-
tinct	perception	 is.	We	get	clues	 for	answering	 this	question	by	not-
ing	which	kinds	of	perceptions	can	be	clear	and	distinct,	and	to	what	
degree.
1.2 Clear and Distinct Sense-Perception, Imagination, and Intellection
Commentators	sometimes	assume	that,	in	Descartes’s	view,	only	intel-
lection	 can	 be	 clear	 and	 distinct;	 sense-perception	 and	 imagination	
cannot.8	 But	 Descartes	 says	 otherwise.9	 He	 explicitly	 invokes	 clear	
visual	 perception	 when	 he	 defines	 clarity,	 in	 Principles	 i.45:	 “we	 see	
something	clearly	when	—	being	present	to	the	eye’s	gaze	—	it	strikes	it	
with	a	sufficient	degree	of	force	and	openness”.	Elsewhere,	he	says,	for	
instance,	that	“we	see	the	sun	very clearly [tres clairement]”	(Discourse	iv,	
AT	6:40†).	He	uses	the	terms	‘lively’	and	‘vivid’	for	sensory	clarity,	and	
says	that	bodies	“produce	in	us	a	certain	very	clear	and	vivid	sensation	
which	we	call	the	sensation	of	colour”	(Pr. i.70,	AT	8A:34).	When	he	
entertains	the	dreaming	argument	in	the	Discourse,	he	asks,	“How	do	
we	know	that	the	thoughts	which	come	to	us	in	dreams	are	any	more	
false	than	the	others,	seeing	that	they	are	often	no	less	lively	and	vivid	
[vives & expresses]?”	(AT	6:38*).10	Sometimes	“imaginings	in	sleep	are	
Rocca	(2005),	DeRose	(1992),	Newman	and	Nelson	(1999),	Parvizian	(forth-
coming),	Pasnau	(2013;	2017:	ch.	1),	Sosa	(1997),	and	Van	Cleve	(2002).	
8.	 This	assumption	is	often	implicit	in	the	literature,	but	is	sometimes	explicit.	
Broughton,	 for	 example,	 asserts	 that	 “Descartes	 plainly	 uses	 ‘natural	 light’	
[the	faculty	of	intellectual	perception]	to	mean	‘faculty	of	distinct	perception’”	
(1984:	607	n.	16).	
9.	 Rickless	(2005:	313–8)	forcefully	makes	this	point.
10.	 Compare	 the	 corresponding	 passage	 in	 the	 First	 Meditation,	 where,	 after	
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A	 perception	 is	 distinct	 when	 it	 is	 clear	 and	 contains	 “only	 what	 is	
clear”	—	when	it	is,	in	other	words,	completely clear.13 The	controversial	
issue	is	what	it	means	for	a	perception	to	be	clear.	The	prevailing	ap-
proach	in	the	literature	is	what	I	will	call	the intentional reading,	which	
proposes	to	analyze	the	clarity	of	a	perception	in	terms	of	an	objective	
property	of	its	intentional	content.	On	the	simplest	version	of	the	in-
tentional	reading	the	relevant	property	is	truth.	We’ll	turn	to	this	inter-
pretation	in	a	moment.	
But	first	I	want	to	address	the	most	common	version	of	the	inten-
tional	reading,	according	to	which	the	relevant	property	is	truth specifi-
cally regarding the nature or essence of the perceived object. In	her	defense	of	
this	reading,	Sarah	Patterson	explains	that	the	gist	of	it	is	that	“having	
a	clear	and	distinct	 idea	of	x involves	understanding	what	does	and	
does	not	belong	to	the	nature	of	x”	(2008:	219).	The	content	of	such	
an	idea	or	perception	is	true	or	accurate	with	respect	to	the	nature	or	
essence	of	its	object.	I	therefore	refer	to	this	as	the	“True-to-Essence	
Reading”	of	clarity	and	distinctness,	or	“TE”	for	short.	Proponents	of	
TE	formulate	it	in	different	ways,	but	we	can	work	with	the	following:
The True-to-Essence Reading (TE)
•	A	perception	of	x	is	clear	to	the	extent	that	it	ascribes	to	x 
features	which	are	consistent	with	the	essence	of	x.
•	 A	 perception	 of	 x	 is	 distinct	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	 is	
clear	 and	 (in	 Descartes’s	 words)	 “contains	 only	 what	
is	 clear”	—	i.e.	 it	 doesn’t ascribe	 to	 x	 features	 which	 are	
inconsistent	with	the	essence	of	x.14
13.	 More	on	this	in	§5,	where	I	will	explain	that	the	terms	‘clear’	and	‘distinct’	are	
interchangeable	when	they	are	used	in	their	strict	senses.
14.	 Patterson	writes:	“The	best-known	account	of	Cartesian	clarity	and	distinct-
ness	is	probably	that	provided	by	Gewirth	(1943).	The	core	of	Gewirth’s	in-
terpretation	 is	 the	notion	 that	an	 idea	of	 x is	minimally	 clear	 if	 it	 contains	
the	property	which	constitutes	 the	nature	and	essence	of	x,	and	minimally	
distinct	if	it	contains	nothing	contradictory	to	the	essence	of	x.	A	minimally	
clear	and	distinct	idea	of	x becomes	clearer	if	more	attributes	necessarily	con-
nected	with	the	nature	of	x are	included	in	it.	The	idea	thereby	also	becomes	
Descartes	is	indeed	a	Rationalist,	since	he	maintains	that	only	intellec-
tion	can	be	clear	and	distinct	in	the	strict	sense	needed	for	certainty:
It	is	clear	that	we	do	not	have	this	kind	of	certainty	in	cases	
where	our	perception	is	even	the	slightest	bit	obscure	or	
confused;	for	such	obscurity,	whatever	its	degree,	is	quite	
sufficient	to	make	us	have	doubts	in	such	cases.	Again,	we 
do not have the required kind of certainty with regard to mat-
ters which we perceive solely by means of the senses, however 
clear such perception may be.	…	Accordingly,	if	there	is	any	
certainty	to	be	had,	the	only	remaining	alternative	is	that	
it	occurs	in	the	clear perceptions of the intellect and nowhere 
else.	(2O/R, AT	7:145†)
As	Descartes	explains	in	the	Sixth	Meditation,	sense-perception	is	de-
signed	to	be	“clear	and	distinct	enough	[satis clarae & distinctae]”	 for	
practical	purposes	(AT	7:83)	—	just	not	enough	for	certainty.12
One	form	of	intellection	is	rational	insight	into	modal	truths	about	
what	 is	 necessary	 or	 merely	 possible,	 including	 truths	 about	 the	 es-
sences	or	natures	of	things.	Another	form	of	intellection	is	introspec-
tion	 or	 what	 Descartes	 calls	 “reflection”,	 which	 targets	 contingent	
truths	about	one’s	own	thoughts.	As	I	will	explain,	both	forms	of	intel-
lection	can	be	completely	clear	—	clear	and	distinct	in	the	strict	sense	
—	and	it	is	only	then	that	they	provide	certainty.
2. Intentional Readings
Commentators	generally	recognize	that	Descartes	defines	distinctness	
in	terms	of	clarity:
I	call	a	perception	“distinct”	when,	as	well	as	being	clear,	it	
is	so	sharply	separated	from	all	other	perceptions	that	it	
contains	within	itself	only what is clear.	(Pr.	i.45,	AT	8A:22†)
12.	 See	Simmons	(2008;	2014).
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perception	is	true	regarding	the	essence	of	its	object	but	is	neverthe-
less	false.	Such	cases	remain	out	of	view	so	long	as	we	focus,	as	Pat-
terson	tends	to	focus,	on	the	abstract	idea	or	perception	of	“the	mind”,	
meaning	the	mind-in-general,	without	referring	to	any	particular	mind.	
Truths	about	 the	mind-in-general	are	exhausted	by	 truths	about	 the	
essence	of	 the	mind.	Such	 truths	are	not	contingent	 truths	but	 rath-
er	modal	truths,	as	they	identify	properties	that	are	either	necessary	
or	possible	for	a	mind:	a	mind	must be	thinking;	a	mind	can be judg-
ing,	doubting,	willing,	 imagining,	 sensing,	 feeling	various	emotions,	
or	 engaging	 in	 any	 other	 mode	 of	 thinking.	 But	 when	 we	 set	 aside	
the	mind-in-general	 to	consider	some	actual	particular	mind,	we	en-
counter	a	further	realm	of	truths	—	contingent truths	about	the	specific	
properties	that	a	particular	mind	does have	at	a	given	moment.	Take	a	
case	where	you	are	trying	to	figure	out	what’s	going	on	in	your	friend’s	
mind.	 Suppose	 that	 by	 misreading	 her	 body	 language	 you	 come	 to	
misperceive	your	friend	as	feeling	anxious	when	she’s	not	anxious	at	
all.	Anxiety	is	consistent	with	the	essence	of	the	mind,	for	Descartes:	
it’s	a	mode	of	thought	—	a	property	that	a	mind	can have.	So,	your	per-
ception	satisfies	TE’s	requirement	for	being	strictly	clear	and	distinct.	
But	anxiety	is	a	property	that	your	friend’s	mind	presently	doesn’t have,	
so	your	perception	is	false,	and	so,	given	the	Truth	Rule,	it	cannot	be	
strictly	clear	and	distinct.
This	kind	of	counterexample	 to	TE	 is	not	 limited	 to	 third-person	
perceptions	of	other	minds.	Analogous	cases	arise	even	when	we	per-
ceive	our	own	minds	through	introspection	or	reflection.	Such	cases	
will	be	off	the	table	for	those	who	assume	that	Descartes	is	committed	
to	“the	epistemological	 transparency	of	mind	or	 thought”	(or	“Trans-
parency”	for	short),	according	to	which	introspection	always	delivers	
indubitable,	infallible,	certain	knowledge	of	one’s	own	thoughts.	But	
as	 I’ve	 argued	 elsewhere,	 Descartes	 rejects	 any	 such	 Transparency	
(Paul	 2018).	 In	 fact,	 he	 documents	 various	 ways	 in	 which	 introspec-
tion	is	fallible.	For	example,	introspection	can	misrepresent	a	purely	
In	Patterson’s	illustration	of	choice,	x is	the	mind.15	Given	Descartes’s	
mind-body	 dualism,	 properties	 that	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 es-
sence	 of	 the	 mind	 include	 the	 principle	 attribute	 of	 the	 mind	—	i.e.	
thought	—	which	“constitutes	the	nature	and	essence	of”	the	mind,	as	
well	as	specific	modes	of	thinking	such	as	judging,	doubting,	willing,	
imagining,	sensing,	and	feeling	emotions,	all	of	which	are	“necessarily	
connected	to	the	nature	of”	the	mind	(Patterson	2008:	219).	Properties	
that	 are	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 essence	 of	 the	 mind	 include	 the	 prin-
cipal	 attribute	 of	 bodies	—	i.e.	 extension	—	as	 well	 as	 specific	 modes	
of	extension,	i.e.	specific	sizes,	shapes,	locations,	and	motions.	So,	on	
Patterson’s	 reading,	 the	more	a	perception	of	 the	mind	ascribes	spe-
cific	 modes	 of	 thought	 to	 the	 mind,	 the	 clearer	 it	 is.	 And	 the	 less it	
ascribes	properties	that	actually	belong	to	bodies	rather	than	minds,	
the	more	distinct	it	is.	TE	allows	that,	as	Descartes	says,	“a	perception	
may	be	clear	without	being	distinct”	(Pr. i.46).16	If	a	perception	of	the	
mind	contains	thinking	or	modes	of	thought,	then	it	is	clear,	but	if	it	
also	contains	bodily	properties,	then	it	is	not	distinct	—	it	is	clear	but	
confused.
TE	has	something	going	for	it.	Descartes’s	Truth	Rule	asserts	that	
if	a	perception	is	strictly	clear	and	distinct,	then	it	must	be	true	—	and	
so,	a fortiori,	it	must	be	true	regarding	the	essence	of	its	object.	Thus,	
TE	identifies	a	condition	that	is	necessary	for	strictly	clear	and	distinct	
perception:	truth regarding essences.
However,	truth	regarding	essences	is	not	sufficient	for	strictly	clear	
and	 distinct	 perception.	 One	 way	 to	 see	 this	 is	 with	 cases	 where	 a	
more	distinct,	since	‘the	richer	its	content,	the	more	is	it	distinguished	from	
what	is	other	than	it’	(Gewirth	1943:	90)”	(Patterson	2008:	219).	In	addition	
to	Gewirth,	Patterson	also	cites	Curley	(1986:	169–70),	and	Smith	(2001:	294),	
to	show	that,	despite	variations	 in	details,	 the	core	 idea	of	TE	is	shared	by	
others	(Patterson	2008:	219–20).	See	also	Smith	(2010;	2015a;	2015b:	56–64;	
Smith	2017:	§5).
15.	 I	will	follow	Patterson’s	emphasis	on	perceptions	of	the	mind,	though	all	of	
the	points	I	will	make	—	both	to	illustrate	her	view	and	to	challenge	it	—	could	
be	made	mutatis mutandis	for	perceptions	of	the	body.
16.	 We’ll	dive	into	this	passage	in	§5	below.
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But	additional	problems	apply	both	to	this	simpler	version	of	the	
intentional	view	and	to	TE	as	well.	One	such	problem	arises	when	we	
turn	to	the	lesser	degrees	of	clarity	and	distinctness,	available	to	the	
senses	and	 imagination,	 for	which	 truth isn’t necessary.	Recall,	 for	ex-
ample,	Descartes’s	assertion	that	a	person	with	jaundice	may	visually	
perceive	that	snow is yellow “just	as	clearly	and	distinctly”	as	most	of	us	
visually	perceive	that	snow is white (AT	7:145).	At	least	one	of	these	con-
tents	is	false.	In	fact,	Descartes	maintains	that,	strictly	speaking,	both	of	
them	are	false.	He	grants	that	there	is	a	sense	in	which	one	of	them	is	
true:	snow	is	indeed	white,	if	“white”	is	taken	to	refer	a	certain	physical	
property,	a	configuration	of	microscopic	particles	that	reflects	light	in	
such	a	way	as	to	cause	perceptions	of	whiteness	in	typical	perceivers.	
But	ordinary	vision	doesn’t	reveal	any	such	microscopic	configuration.	
What	vision	depicts	 instead	are	what	commentators	call	 sensible	or	
sensuous	colours,	which	do	not	belong	to	bodies	at	all,	in	Descartes’s	
view,	but	are	rather	just	projections	of	the	mind.20	It	is	useful	for	us	to	
see	bodies	as	sensuously	coloured,	because	 it	helps	us	navigate	our	
surroundings,	but	it	is	a	useful	illusion.	Insofar	as	we	are	talking	about	
sensuous	colours	—	colours	as	they	appear	visually	—	snow	is	neither	
white	nor	yellow.	It	doesn’t	have	any	sensuous	colour	at	all.	No	physi-
cal	object	does.	So,	 in	depicting	snow	as	yellow	and	snow	as	white,	
respectively,	the	perceptions	in	question	aren’t	true	regarding	the	es-
sence	of	snow	(nor	of	any	physical	object)	and	indeed	they	aren’t	true	
at	all.	And	yet,	Descartes	says,	both	of	them	are	(to	a	degree	available	
to	the	senses)	clear	and	distinct.
Let’s	 return	 to	 the	 case	 of	 strictly	 clear	 and	 distinct	 (intellectual)	
perception,	for	which	truth	is	necessary.	Even	so,	truth	isn’t	sufficient.	
A	perception	may	be	true	even	though	it	is	obscure	or	confused.	Des-
cartes	makes	 this	plain	when	he	 insists	 that	 it’s	always	 improper,	 in	
the	context	of	the	Meditations,	to	assent	to	perception	that	isn’t	strict-
ly	clear	and	distinct	—	even	if,	 in	doing	so,	“by	chance	I	arrive	at	the	
truth”.	In	the	Meditations,	where	the	standards	for	assent	are	maximally	
20.	See	Chamberlain	(2019b),	Nolan	(2011),	Rozemond	(1996),	Simmons	(2008).
intellectual	act	of	 conceiving	as	an	act	of	 imagining;17	 a	weak	belief	
as	a	strong	belief;18	and	an	obscure	perception	as	a	clear	perception.19 
In	all	of	these	cases,	introspection	represents	one’s	mind	in	ways	that	
are	consistent	with	the	essence	of	the	mind	(as	having	features	it	can 
have),	so	it	satisfies	TE’s	condition;	and	yet	it	misrepresents	one’s	mind	
(as	having	 features	 it	doesn’t have),	 so	 it	 cannot	be	strictly	clear	and	
distinct.	
Perhaps	TE’s	requirement	is	just	too	narrow.	Perhaps	what	makes	a	
perception	clear	and	distinct	is	not	that	its	content	is	true	just	regarding	
essences,	but	more	broadly	that	its	content	is	true.	This	is	the	simpler	
version	of	the	intentional	view	that	I	mentioned	earlier.	Defending	it,	
Thomas	Lennon	asserts,	“Perceiving	the	truth	clearly	and	distinctly	is	
not	some	mysterious	additional	episode.	It	is	just	perceiving	the	truth”	
(Lennon	2008:	172).	As	with	TE,	this	alternative	can	be	formulated	in	
different	ways.	But	the	basic	idea	is	this:	A	perception	is	clear	to	the	
extent	that	 its	content	is	true,	and	distinct	to	the	extent	that	(in	Des-
cartes’s	 words)	 it	 “contains	 only	 what	 is	 clear”	—	so,	 on	 this	 reading,	
only what is true.	The	content	of	such	a	perception	is	completely	true.	
When	a	content	is	completely	true,	that	does	not	mean	that	it	rep-
resents	all	truths,	or	even	all	truths	concerning	the	perceived	object.	It	
just	means	that	everything	it	does	represent	is	true,	which	is	compat-
ible	with	it	making	no	claim	whatsoever	about	any	number	of	other	
truths	(AT	7:220–1).	Such	a	perception	contains	the	truth	and	only	the	
truth.	It	needn’t	contain	the	whole	truth.
This	version	of	the	intentional	view	is	more	promising	than	TE.	It	
avoids	the	counterexamples	to	TE	that	we’ve	considered	so	far.	And	
since	 the	 Truth	 Rule	 provides	 that	 strictly	 clear	 and	 distinct	 percep-
tions	must	be	completely	true	(not	just	true	regarding	essences),	this	
view	does	a	better	job	than	TE	does	of	specifying	a	condition	that	is	
necessary	for	strictly	clear	and	distinct	perception:	truth.
17. AT	3:798–9;	see	Curley	(1978:	177–8).
18. AT	3:395;	see	Radner	(1988)	and	Rozemond	(2006).
19. AT	6:33;	AT	7:35;	AT	8A:21;	AT	8B:352;	see	M.	Wilson	(1978:	155).
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make	bold	to	assert	that	he	will	not	on	that	account	be	a	
true	believer,	but	will	instead	be	committing	a	sin	by	not	
using	his	reason	properly.	(AT	7:148*;	cf.	AT	7:208)
To	drive	home	the	distinction	between	perceiving	a	truth	and	per-
ceiving	it	clearly,	consider	that	you	can	perceive	a	truth	in	any	number	
of	different	ways.	For	example,	if	you	merely	consider	the	proposition	
God exists as the infinitely perfect immaterial being,	 perhaps	 to	 wonder	
whether	it’s	true,	then	the	content	of	your	thought	happens	to	be	true	
(by	Descartes’s	lights)	—	and	it’s	true	regarding	the	essence	of	God,	so	
it	satisfies	the	TE	condition	—	but	you	wouldn’t	thereby	have	a	clear	
and	distinct	perception.	Descartes	holds	that	clear	and	distinct	percep-
tions	 compel assent.	 But,	 as	 this	 example	 illustrates,	 merely	 consid-
ering	a	proposition	that	happens	to	be	true	does	not	compel	assent.	
So,	a	perception’s	being	true	cannot	be	sufficient	for	strict	clarity	and	
distinctness.21
This	problem	generalizes	in	two	ways.	We	get	the	same	problem	
if	we	substitute	mere	considering	with	any	number	of	other	attitudes	
that	are	not	strictly	clear	or	distinct,	even	when	their	contents	happen	
(according	to	Descartes)	to	be	true.	If,	for	example,	you	assume,	pre-
tend,	guess,	hope,	or	doubt	that	God exists,	you	do	not	thereby	clearly	
perceive	 that	 God exists.	 And	 we	 get	 the	 same	 problem	 yet	 again	 if	
we	 substitute	 the	 proposition	 about	 God	 with	 any	 other	 proposi-
tion.	Regardless	of	what	p is	—	even	if	p happens	to	be	true	regarding	
21.	 I	think	Smith	has	a	real	insight	when	he	says	that	a	clear	idea	of	x	exhibits	
the	element	or	elements	that	constitute	the	nature	of	x,	along	with	the	rela-
tion	that	unifies	them,	if	x is	complex	(Smith	2001:	294).	I	see	this	as	a	pre-
cisification	of	the	truth	requirement	for	strict	clarity	—	but	again,	it	would	be	
necessary	but	not	sufficient.	What	is	missing,	I	will	argue,	is	the	phenomenal	
quality	that	is	clarity.	Smith’s	use	of	the	term	“exhibit”	might	point	in	the	right	
direction,	since,	as	Barth	(2016)	has	shown,	Descartes	uses	exhibere	to	say	an	
object	or	idea	is	exhibited	or	displayed	to	the	subject	in	consciousness,	and	
thus	with	phenomenality.	Even	so,	there	is	still	the	further	question	of	how	
well	—	how	clearly	—	an	idea	is	exhibited,	since	many	ideas	are	exhibited	ob-
scurely.	In	any	case,	Smith	doesn’t	go	in	this	direction.	On	his	reading,	what	
makes	a	perception	clear	and	distinct	is	just	that	it	has	the	right	kind	of	con-
tent,	and	so	he	makes	no	mention	of	phenomenality,	subjectivity,	conscious-
ness,	or	anything	of	that	sort.
high,	Descartes	says	you	are	“in	error”	and	using	your	will	“improperly	
[non recte]”	 whenever	 you	 assent	 to	 a	 perception	 that	 is	 in	 any	 way	
obscure	—	even	if	“by	chance	[you]	arrive	at	the	truth”.	Sometimes	an	
obscure	perception	“happens	to	be	true”.	In	such	cases,	what	you	per-
ceive	is	true,	even	while	you	“do	not	perceive	the	truth	with	sufficient	
clarity	and	distinctness”	(AT	7:59–60).	Truth	is	not	enough.
In	the	Second	Replies,	Descartes	indicates	further	that,	contrary	to	
the	purely	intentional	reading,	the	clarity	of	a	perception	is	not	merely	
a	matter	of	its	content:
We	 must	 distinguish	 between	 the	 subject-matter	 [mate-
riam],	or	the	thing	itself	which	we	assent	to,	and	the	for-
mal	reason	[ratio formalis]	which	moves	the	will	to	give	its	
assent:	it	is	only	in	respect	of	the	reason	that	transparent	
clarity	 is	 required	 [sola ratione perspicuitatem requirimus].	
(AT	7:147–8)	
Descartes	 uses	 the	 phrase	 ‘formal	 reason’	 to	 contrast	 the	 content	 or	
“subject-matter”	of	a	perception	with	the	particular	form of	perception,	
namely	clear	perception,	that	provides	a	reason	for	assent.	You	make	
a	 judgement	when	you	assent	 to	 the	content	of	a	perception.	But	 if	
you	 have	 a	 reason for	 assenting,	 what	 gives	 you	 a	 reason	 is	 not	 the	
content	itself	but	rather	the	particular	way	in	which	you	perceive	the	
content	—	i.e.	clearly.	Indeed,	Descartes	adds,	“this	formal	reason	con-
sists	in	a	certain	inner	light	[haec ratio formalis consistit in lumine quodam 
interno]”	(Ibid.);	and	this	“‘light	in	the	intellect’	means	transparent	clar-
ity	 of	 cognition”	 (3O/R, AT	 7:192).	 Mental	 illumination	—	clarity	—	is	
something	over	and	above	the	content	it	shines	upon,	even	when	the	
content	is	true.	A	content	may	true	but	unclear	to	you	—	in	which	case,	
you	shouldn’t	assent	to	it.	As	an	example,	Descartes	gives	“the	case	of	
the	infidel”	who	believes	Christian	doctrines	which	are	obscure	to	the	
infidel	but	nonetheless	true	(in	Descartes’s	view):
If,	despite	the	fact	that	these	doctrines	are	obscure	to	him,	
he	is	induced	to	embrace	them	by	fallacious	arguments,	I	
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conceive	of	a	chiliagon	(as	a	thousand-sided	figure),	and	this	differs	
from	 what	 it’s	 like	 to	 imagine	 a	 chiliagon	 (AT	 7:72).24	 Moreover,	 in-
tellectual	thoughts	differ	from	each	other	in	their	phenomenality.	For	
example,	what	it’s	like	to	intellectually	conceive	of	a	chiliagon	differs	
from	what	it’s	like	to	do	long	division	in	your	mind,	and	so	on.	Despite	
such	variations,	 I	argue,	Descartes	recognizes	a	phenomenal	quality	
that	is	shared,	to	varying	degrees,	by	some	sensory	thoughts	and	some	
intellectual	thoughts,	namely	clarity.	
The	phenomenal	reading	of	clarity	has	not	been	given	a	fair	hear-
ing.25	Before	confirming	that	Descartes	views	clarity	as	a	phenomenal	
quality,	we	need	to	explain	carefully	what	that	view	amounts	to.	Fol-
lowing	Descartes’s	dictum	 that	 the	nature	of	 clarity	 is	 to	be	 learned	
through	examples	(AT	7:164),	I	will	begin	with	examples	both	of	sen-
sory	clarity	(§3.1)	and	intellectual	clarity	(§3.2).	I	will	then	explain	that	
clarity	is	adverbial	in	the	sense	that	it	is	a	way	of	perceiving	a	content,	
whereby	the	content	strikes	the	perceiver	as	true	(§3.3).	
3.1 Sensory Examples
For	sensory	examples,	let’s	focus,	as	Descartes	does,	on	cases	of	vision.	
Start	with	the	visual	experience	you’re	having	right	now.	This	page	is	
visually	clear	to	you	—	or	‘vivid	and	lively’	to	you,	as	Descartes	also	puts	
it,	using	terms	that	plainly	denote	a	phenomenal	quality.	While	he	re-
serves	that	pair	of	terms	for	imagistic	forms	of	clarity	in	the	senses	and	
imagination,	he	uses	the	term	‘present’	for	what	is	clear	through	any	
form	of	perception,	including	intellection.	Clarity	is	presentational.26 
of	 our	 thoughts	 (AT	 7:160;	 AT	 8A:7),	 and	 (ii)	 consciousness	 imbues	 our	
thoughts	with	phenomenality.	See	Simmons	(2012).
24.	 See	Simmons	(2012:	4).
25.	 None	of	the	proponents	of	the	dominant,	intentional	approach	(cited	above	
in	n.	14)	cite	any	defense	of	the	phenomenal	reading.	Patterson	is	the	only	
one	who	even	mentions	the	phenomenal	alternative,	as	an	after-thought	in	
the	conclusion	of	her	essay	(2008:	232).	Gaukroger	(1992)	offers	something	
like	the	phenomenal	reading,	but	his	take	is	uncharitable,	as	I	will	explain	in	
§3.2.
26.	Presentational	 phenomenology	 is	 of	 vital	 interest	 to	 some	 contemporary	
essences,	 or	 even	 completely	 true	—	if	 you	 merely	 consider,	 assume,	
pretend,	guess,	hope,	or	doubt	p,	you	do	not	thereby	perceive	p clearly	
or	distinctly.
In	sum,	what	makes	a	perception	clear	 is	not	merely	that	 its	con-
tent	has	a	certain	objective	property,	such	as	truth	or	truth	regarding	
essences	 or	 natures.	 Truth	 isn’t	 necessary	 for	 the	 lesser	 degrees	 of	
clarity	available	to	the	senses	and	imagination.	And	although	truth	is	
necessary	for	the	highest	degree	of	clarity	—	completely	clear	intellec-
tion	—	truth	isn’t	sufficient.	Clarity	is	not	a	matter	of	the	content	itself	
but	of	the	way in	which	it	is	perceived.	To	perceive	something	clearly	is	
to	perceive	it	in	a	certain	way	—	a	way	that	is	characterized,	I	will	argue,	
by	its	phenomenality.
3. Explaining the Phenomenal View
The	 phenomenality,	 or	 phenomenal	 character,	 of	 a	 thought	 is	 the	
subjectively	felt	or	experienced	quality	of	“what	it’s	like”	to	have	that	
thought.22	 Remember	 that	 Descartes	 uses	 the	 term	 ‘thought’	 (cogi-
tatio/ pensée)	 very	 broadly	 to	 include	 judging,	 doubting,	 conceiving,	
sensing,	 imagining,	and	occurrent	emotions	—	any	conscious	mental	
event. The	phenomenality	of	Cartesian	thought	is	exemplified	by	the	
“first	and	simple	thoughts	of	infants”,	including	“the	pain	they	feel	from	
some	wind	that	distends	their	intestines,	or	the	pleasure	they	feel	from	
being	nourished	by	sweet	blood”	(AT	5:221†;	cf.	AT	3:424,	AT	8A:35).	
Other	 paradigmatic	 examples	 of	 phenomenal	 events	 include	 other	
forms	of	sensing,	as	well	as	imagining	and	occurrent	emotions.	In	fact,	
Descartes	holds	that	all	thoughts	have	phenomenality,	including	intel-
lectual	ones.23	For	example,	there’s	something	it’s	like	to	intellectually	
22.	 This	use	of	 the	phrase	 “what	 it’s	 like”	was	made	 famous	by	Nagel	 (1974).	 I	
use	 ‘phenomenality’	 for	 the	 relevant	 quality,	 and	 ‘phenomenology’	 for	 the	
study	or	description	of	that	quality.	Scholars	have	documented	a	variety	of	
ways	in	which	Descartes	attends	to	the	phenomenal	dimension	of	our	mental	
lives.	See,	for	example,	Barth	(2016),	Chamberlain	(2016;	2019a),	Greenberg	
(2007),	 Lähteenmäki	 (2007),	 Nadler	 (2011:	 134),	 Shapiro	 (2012),	 Simmons	
(2008;	2012;	2017).
23.	 This	 follows	 from	 two	 Cartesian	 commitments:	 (i)	 we	 are	 conscious	 of	 all	
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“vivid	 images”	 in	 the	 mind	 which	 are	 “forceful”	 or	 “compelling”.	 But	
then	 he	 complains	 that	 Descartes	 makes	 “a	 laughing-stock”	 of	 this	
quality	by	trying	to	transport	it	to	the	pure	intellect	(Gaukroger	1992:	
585,	602).27	I	disagree.	While	clarity	might	be	more	familiar	in	its	imag-
istic	form,	pure	intellection	can	definitely	be	clear.	The	way	to	appreci-
ate	this	is	again	through	examples.
The	only	propositions	that	can	be	completely	clear	to	the	pure	in-
tellect	are	truths,	according	to	Descartes,	and	the	relevant	truths	range	
across	the	a	priori	matters	of	mathematics,	logic,	and	metaphysics.	The	
basic	form	of	completely	clear	intellection	is	an	intuition.	When	a	com-
pletely	clear	intellection	involves	inference,	it’s	a	deduction.28	The	con-
tents	of	intuitions	are	axioms	or	first	principles.	Here	are	a	few	of	the	
many	examples	Descartes	gives	from	math:
A.	2+3=5
B. A	square	has	four	sides
C. A	sphere	has	a	single	surface29
These	 axioms	 are	 so	 simple	 that	 a	 typical	 mature	 human	 can	 intuit	
them	 directly,	 just	 by	 attentively	 considering	 them.	 Contrast	 this	
theorem:
D. If	π(x)	is	the	number	of	primes	less	than	or	equal	to	x, 
then	x−1π(x)	ln	x →	1	as	x → ∞.30
27.	 Gaukroger	contends	 that	 this	 is	a	shift	 from	Descartes’s	early	work,	 the	Re-
gulae,	to	his	later	work.	In	my	view,	Descartes	consistently	holds	throughout	
his	career	that	perceptions	of	all	kinds	can	be	clear	to	some	degree	but	only	
intellection	 can	 be	 completely	 clear.	 Despite	 my	 disagreement	 with	 Gauk-
roger,	he	makes	a	valuable	contribution	in	tracing	Cartesian	clarity	to	the	Ro-
man	rhetorical	tradition,	including	Quintilian.	Building	on	Gaukroger,	Jones	
(2006:	ch.	2)	enriches	this	part	of	the	story.	Still,	I	think	a	more	important	line	
of	influence	stems	from	Stoic	epistemology	(see	n.	37	below).
28.	 I	 expound	 Descartes’s	 notions	 of	 intuition	 and	 deduction,	 as	 two	 forms	 of	
completely	clear	intellection,	in	Paul	(forthcoming:	ch.	8).
29.	See	AT	7:36	and	AT	10:368.
30.	This	the	Prime	Number	Theorem,	proven	(independently)	by	Hadamard	and	
de	la	Vallée	Poussin	in	1896.	
When	you	perceive	p	clearly,	your	perception	doesn’t	merely	have	p	as	
its	content;	it	presents p	to	you	as	true.	When	p	is	clear	or	present	to	you,	
we	might	say,	in	other	words,	that	p strikes	you	as	true,	or that	p feels, 
seems,	or	appears	to	you	to	be	true.	
Contrast	your	clear	vision	of	this	page	with	the	experience	you’d	
have	if,	without	seeing	any	page,	you	were	merely	to	you	assume,	pre-
tend,	guess,	hope,	or	doubt	that	there’s	a	page	here.	All	of	these	mental	
attitudes	have	the	same	content:	there’s	a	page	here.	And	yet	only	vi-
sion	presents the	page	to	you	as	being	right	there	in	front	of	you.	Only	
vision	presents	it	to	you	as	true	that	there’s	a	page	here.
Once	we	interpret	clarity	as	this	presentational	phenomenal	quality,	
it	makes	perfect	sense	when	Descartes	says	that	one	person	may	see	
snow	as	yellow	just	as	clearly	as	someone	else	sees	snow	as	white	(AT 
7:145).	He	is	not	saying	that	these	contradictory	contents	are	equally	
true,	as	the	intentional	reading	would	entail.	Rather,	he’s	saying	that	
that	these	two	contents	are	equally	presented	as	true	—	they	equally	
feel,	seem,	or	appear	to	be	true	—	to	their	respective perceivers. 
We	mention	truth	to	elucidate	clarity,	but	not	in	the	way	assumed	
by	the	intentional	reading.	What	it	means	for	a	perception	to	be	clear	
is	not	that	its	content	is	true	as	a	matter	of	objective	fact,	but	rather	
that	its	content	is	presented	as	true	to	the	conscious	perceiver,	which	
is	a	matter	of	its	subjective,	phenomenal	character.	When	it	comes	to	
the	senses,	at	least,	clarity	isn’t	truth.	It’s	a	feeling	of	truth.
3.2 Intellectual Examples
The	phenomenal	reading	of	clarity	has	been	hampered	by	the	assump-
tion	that	phenomenality	 is	 limited	to	sensing,	 imagining,	and	occur-
rent	emotions.	As	far	as	I’m	aware,	the	commentator	who	comes	the	
closest	to	the	reading	I	propose	is	Stephen	Gaukroger,	who	seems	to	
indicate	the	phenomenal	quality	we	noted	above	when	he	says	that	
clarity	 is	 readily	 recognizable	 in	 “vivid	 pictorial	 representations”	 or	
epistemologists	—	see,	e.g.,	the	excellent	work	of	Bengson	(2015a;	2015b)	and	
Chudnoff	(2013)	—	though	I	cannot	here	get	into	how	Descartes’s	views	relate	
to	theirs.
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This	example	follows	the	same	pattern	as	the	one	Descartes	uses	to	
introduce	his	notion	of	deduction	in	Rule	3	of	the	Rules (AT	10:368).33 
As	he	explains	there,	a	deduction	is	a	chain	of	intuitions:	you	clearly	
intuit	each	premise;	you	clearly	intuit	the	fact	that	the	premises	entail	
the	conclusion;	and	you	thereby	clearly	deduce	the	conclusion.
Some	 truths	 are	 readily	 made	 clear	 through	 diagrams	 or	 illus-
trations.34 F should	 become	 clear	 to	 you	 when	 you	 reflect	 on	 this	
illustration:
G should	become	clear	to	you	thanks	to	this	illustration:
H	should	become	clear	to	you	with	this	illustration:
Each	proposition	—	E, F, G, H	—	was	true	from	the	beginning	when	
you	perceived	it	obscurely.	Each	would	be	true	if	you	were	to	assume,	
pretend,	guess,	hope,	or	doubt	that	it’s	true	—	which	are	all	ways	of	per-
ceiving	obscurely.	So	again,	 contrary	 to	 the	 intentional	 reading,	per-
ceiving	something	clearly	 is	not	simply	a	matter	of	perceiving	some-
thing	true.	Notice	what	it’s	like	as	each	proposition	becomes	clear	to	
you.	 It’s	 like	 the	 truth	gets	 illuminated.	 In	each	case,	 the	proposition	
33.	 His	example	is:	2+2	=	4;	1+3	=	4;	therefore,	2+2	=	3+1.
34.	 In	such	cases,	Descartes	insists	that	it	is	still	through	your	intellect	that	you	
see	 truths	clearly,	even	 though	your	 intellect	 is	 “helped”	by	your	senses	or	
imagination.	See	Rules	12–18	of	the	Regulae	(AT	10:411–69).	For	commentary,	
see	Sepper	(1989,	1996).
Whereas	A, B,	and	C	were	clear	to	you	as	soon	as	you	considered	them,	
D	is	presumably	obscure	to	you.	All	of	these	propositions	are	true,	so	
the	 difference	 isn’t	 a	 matter	 of	 truth.	 It’s	 a	 matter	 of	 phenomenality.	
What’s	it’s	 like	to	perceive	the	first	three	truths	(clearly)	differs	from	
what	it’s	like	to	perceive	this	last	one	(obscurely).	Only	the	first	three	
are	presented	to	you,	or	strike	you,	as	true.	
It’s	especially	useful	to	consider	cases	where	a	truth	becomes clear 
to	you	after	being	obscure	to	you	at	first.	D	could	become	clear	to	you,	
but	you	would	have	to	work	through	arduous	demonstrations	to	get	
there.	Instead,	let’s	take	some	cases	that	are	a	little	more	complex	than	
the	first	three	above,	but	not	as	complex	as	D:
E. The	 sum	 of	 the	 numbers	 1,	 2,	 and	 3	 is	 equal	 to	 their	
product.31
F. Whenever	two	lines	intersect,	they	produce	two	pairs	
of	equal	angles.
G. Every	concave	figure	can	be	rounded	out	to	a	convex	
figure	that	bounds	a	greater	area	in	a	smaller	perimeter.32
H. Two	differently	sized	circles	can	have	at	most	two	com-
mon	points.
Each	of	these	may	be	obscure	to	you	at	first.	But	E	will	become	clear	to	
you	through	this	simple	deduction:
1+2+3	=	6 
1x2x3	=	6 
Therefore,	1+2+3	=	1x2x3
If	E was	already clear	to	you	as	soon	as	you	considered	it,	I	suspect	it’s	
because	 you	 automatically	 performed	 a	 deduction	 like	 this	 yourself.	
31.	 Thanks	to	William	Egri	for	suggesting	examples	E	and	F.
32.	 I	borrow	examples	G and H	from	Chudnoff	(2013).	He	uses	them	to	illustrate	
the	contemporary	notion	of	intuition,	however,	and	it	should	be	noted	that	
some	of	the	mental	states	Chudnoff	classifies	as	intuitions	are	dubitable	and/
or	fallible,	and	so	wouldn’t	count	as	intuitions	(intuitus)	in	Descartes’s	sense.
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introspectively	—	it	may	not	strike	you	—	that	what	you	have	is	pain,	as	
opposed	to,	say,	an	itch	or	a	tickle.	If	you	have	an	intense,	searing	pain,	
by	contrast,	 then	 it	will	be	very	clear	 to	you	 introspectively	—	it	will	
strike	you	forcefully	—	that	what	you	have	is	pain.	
But	even	when	introspection	is	very	clear,	Descartes	holds	that,	or-
dinarily,	it	won’t	be	completely	clear.	This	is	because,	ordinarily,	intro-
spection	is	confused	with	obscure	perceptions	of	your	body	in	a	way	
that	lessens	its	clarity.	I	will	explain	this	in	§5	below.	For	now,	though,	
we	need	to	get	precise	about	the	kind	of	phenomenal	quality	that	clar-
ity	is.
3.3 Clarity Is Adverbial
One	 obstacle	 to	 seeing	 the	 viability	 of	 the	 phenomenal	 reading	 is	
an	 outmoded	 conception	 of	 phenomenality.	 When	 analytic	 philoso-
phers	began	to	take	special	 interest	 in	phenomenal	mental	states	as	
such,	in	the	first	half	of	the	20th	century,	they	tended	to	contrast	them	
with	intentional	states,	and	often	assumed	that	the	two	are	mutually	
exclusive.35	 The	 paradigm	 examples	 of	 phenomenal	 states	 were	 so-
called	“raw	feels”	or	“brute	sensations”	—	pain	being	their	favorite	ex-
ample	—	which	they	thought	had	phenomenality	but	no	intentionality.	
They	contrasted	these	with	beliefs,	desires,	and	other	attitudes,	which	
they	 thought	 had	 intentionality	 but	 no	 phenomenality.	 Sarah	 Patter-
son	seems	to	adopt	this	dichotomy	when	she	opposes	her	“intentional	
view”	of	clarity	 to	 the	“phenomenal	view”,	and	suggests	 that,	on	the	
phenomenal	view,	clear	(and	distinct)	perception	is	merely	“a	kind	of	
feeling	that	compels	the	will	to	assent”,	a	feeling	which	exerts	a	“brute	
compulsion”	and	which	one	might	“compare	to	pain”	(Patterson	2008:	
232).	But	this	is	a	caricature.	On	a	charitable	version	of	the	phenom-
enal	view,	clarity	is	not	a	brute	feeling	devoid	of	content.	In	fact,	there	
is	no	such	thing	as	clarity	without	content.	Just	as	you	cannot	have	a	
perception	without	some	content	that	you	perceive,	you	cannot	have	
a	clear	perception	without	some	content	that	you	perceive	clearly.	To	
35.	 Barth	(2016:	17)	helpfully	makes	this	observation.
goes	from	being	one	that	you’re	merely	considering	to	one	that	is	pre-
sented	to	you,	or	strikes	you,	as	true.	In	this	respect,	intellectual	clarity	
is	akin	to	sensory	clarity:	it,	too,	is	a	feeling	of	truth.
There	 are	 differences,	 however.	 One	 difference	 we	 should	 stress	
right	 away	 is	 that	 only	 intellection	 can	 be	 completely	 clear,	 in	 Des-
cartes’s	view,	and	when	it	is,	it’s	infallible.	What	completely	clear	intel-
lection	presents	as	true	is	always	some	truth,	some	bit	of	reality.	In	such	
a	case,	it	would	be	an	understatement	to	say,	as	we	do	with	sensory	
clarity,	that	something	‘seems’	or	‘appears’	to	be	true,	for	in	this	case,	
“if	something	is	clearly	perceived,	then	…	it	is	true,	and	does	not	mere-
ly	seems	or	appear	 to	be	 true”	 (AT	 7:511†).	Thus,	Descartes	employs	
success-entailing	terms	to	say	that	what	you	perceive	in	such	cases	is	
‘evident’,	 ‘manifest’,	or	 ‘transparently	clear’	to	you	(evidens, manifestus, 
perspicuus)	—	terms	that	don’t	apply	to	fallible	perceptions.	By	contrast,	
sensory	clarity	is	fallible:	what	it	presents	as	true	may	in	fact	be	false.
While	the	examples	canvassed	so	far	are	from	math,	Descartes	also	
invokes	completely	clear	intellection	in	metaphysics,	which	includes	
all	truths	about	the	existence	of	things	and	the	natures	of	things	that	
exist:	minds,	bodies,	and	properties	thereof.	Many	of	these	are	neces-
sary	truths	or	‘eternal	truths’,	but	some	of	them	are	contingent.	Indeed,	
“the	first	principle”	of	Descartes’s	metaphysics	is	his	famous	cogito	ar-
gument	—	“I	am	thinking,	therefore	I	am”	—	in	which	the	premise	and	
conclusion	 are	 both	 contingent	 truths.	 Descartes	 often	 replaces	 the	
generic	premise	I am thinking	with	claims	about	the	specific	thought	
one	is	having	at	a	given	moment:	I am doubting; I think I am walking; I 
seem to see such-as-such, and	so	on. If	you	were	to	apprehend	any	such	
truth,	then	you	would	do	so	through	introspection,	a	higher-order	act	
of	perceiving	your	own	current	thoughts.	Introspection	itself	is	always	
intellectual,	even	when	the	lower-order	thought	to	which	it	is	directed	
is	sensory	or	imaginative	(AT	5:221;	AT	7:358).	As	a	form	of	intellec-
tion,	 introspection	 can be	 completely	 clear,	 but	 that	 doesn’t	 mean	 it	
always	is.	
For	 starters,	 like	 any	 form	 of	 perception,	 introspection	 admits	 of	
variations	in	clarity.	If	you	have	a	mild	pain,	it	may	not	be	clear	to	you	
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say	that	the	robin	is	clear	to	you,	all	this	means	is	that	you	perceive	
the	robin	clearly.	Clarity	is	not	what	you	perceive	when	you	are	close	
to	the	robin.	Rather,	clarity	qualifies	the	way	you	perceive	the	robin	
when	you	are	close	to	it.	And	this	way	of	perceiving	is	characterized	
by	 its	distinctive	phenomenality:	what	 it’s	 like	 to	perceive	 the	robin	
clearly	differs	from	what	it’s	like	to	perceive	it	obscurely.36
Surface	grammar	can	be	misleading.	When	we	say	 that	your	per-
ception	represents	something	as	red,	this	just	means	that	red is	a	predi-
cate	 within	 the	 content	 of	 your	 perception.	 When	 I	 say	 that	 a	 clear	
perception	of	p	presents	p	as	true	to	you,	one	might	think	that,	likewise,	
this	just	means	that	true	is	a	predicate	within	the	content	of	your	per-
ception.	But	that	would	be	a	misunderstanding.	To	see	why,	let	p	be	
the	proposition,	for	example,	that	there	are	Martians.	If	you	suppose	
for	the	sake	of	argument	that	it’s true that there are Martians,	then	true is	
a	predicate	within	the	content	of	your	supposition,	but	this	does	not	
by	any	means	make	it	clear	to	you	—	it	doesn’t	thereby	strike	you	—	that	
there	are	Martians.	In	§2	we	saw	that	perceiving	a	content	which	hap-
pens	to	be	true	is	not	sufficient	for	perceiving	it	clearly.	Here	we	see	
further	 that	predicating	 truth	of	a	proposition	within	 the	content	of	
your	perception	is	not	sufficient	for	perceiving	it	clearly.	
Descartes	uses	the	following	forms	of	locution	interchangeably:
p is	clear	to	S. 
S	has	a	clear	perception	that	p. 
S	clearly	perceives	that	p.
All	three	of	these	locutions	mean	the	same	thing,	but	the	last	one	—	us-
ing	the	adverb	‘clearly’	—	is	the	most	apt	because	it	indicates	that	clar-
ity	is	an	adverbial	quality,	modifying	the	way	in	which	a	subject	per-
ceives	something.37
36.	 I	don’t	deny	that	clarity	can	be	an	object	of	perception.	When	you	have	a	clear	
perception,	 the	 clarity	 of	 that	 perception	 may	 become	 the	 object	 of	 an	 ad-
ditional,	higher-order	act	of	introspection;	you	may	introspectively	perceive	
the	clarity	of	your	lower-order	perception.	The	point	remains	that	the	clarity	
of	the	lower-order	perception	is	not	an	object	of	that	very	perception.
37.	 Lennon	gets	on	 the	 right	 track	momentarily	when	he	observes	 that	 clarity	
perceive	a	content	clearly	is	to	perceive	it	in	a	phenomenally	distinc-
tive	way.	
Insofar	as	clarity	is	a	way	of	perceiving	content,	it	needn’t	be	part	of	
the	content	itself.	Let’s	distinguish	between	two	kinds	of	phenomenal	
qualities.	On	one	hand,	some	phenomenal	qualities	figure	in	the	con-
tent	of	perception;	they	are	qualities	that	seem	to	belong	to	the	objects	
we	 perceive.	 For	 example,	 sensuous	 qualities	 like	 colour,	 heat,	 and	
taste	appear	 to	be	properties	of	 things	we	perceive:	 the	apple	 looks	
red,	the	stove	feels	hot,	the	mango	tastes	sweet.	Such	qualities	are	part	
of	what we	perceive.
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 some	 phenomenal	 qualities	 are	 adverbial:	
within	a	given	perception,	they	are	not	part	of	what	we	perceive,	but	
characterize	the	way	we	are	perceiving.	Adverbial	phenomenal	quali-
ties	include	the	ones	that	vary	between	perceptual	modalities,	which	
are,	literally,	different	ways	of	perceiving.	Compare	vision	and	touch.	
What	it’s	like	to	see	with	your	eyes	that	a	ball	is	round	is	different	from	
what	it’s	like	to	feel	with	your	hands	that	the	ball	is	round.	The	phe-
nomenal	qualities	of	seeing	and	touching	are	not	perceived	as	proper-
ties	of	the	ball,	like	roundness	is;	instead,	they	characterize	different	
ways	of	perceiving	the	roundness	of	the	ball.	Qualities	of	this	sort	can	
be	referred	to	with	adverbs	—	what	it’s	like	to	perceive	roundness	visu-
ally	differs	from	what	it’s	like	to	perceive	roundness	haptically	—	which	
indicate	ways	of	perceiving	rather	than	objects	perceived.
Clarity	 is	 likewise	 an	 adverbial	 phenomenal	 quality.	 When	 your	
perception	is	clear,	its	clarity	is	not	an	object	of	that	very	perception,	
but	 characterizes	 the	 way	 you	 are	 perceiving.	 Suppose	 you’re	 look-
ing	at	a	 robin	 in	 the	woods.	When	 it’s	 far	away	and	you	perceive	 it	
obscurely,	you	perceive	it	as	having	a	certain	shape	and	colour. When	
you	get	 closer	and	you	perceive	 it	 clearly,	you	perceive	 it	 as	having	
several	additional	properties	—	eyes,	a	beak,	a	certain	texture	of	feath-
ers,	etc.	—	but	clarity	is	not	among	them.	We	can	of	course	say	that	the	
robin	is	now	clear	—	or	more	precisely	that	it’s	now	clear	to you	—	but	
that	 should	 not	 mislead	 us	 into	 reifying	 a	 referent	 for	 ‘clear’	 as	 if	 it	
were	some	thing	or	property	that	you’ve	now	come	to	see.	When	we	
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is	an	attempt	to	explain	or	convey	what	x is,	let	us	distinguish	between	
logical definitions and	ostensive definitions.	To	start	with	the	former:
A logical definition of	x is	an	attempt	to	convey	what	x is 
by	analyzing	x into	more	basic	conditions	that	are	each	
logically	 necessary	 and	 together	 logically	 sufficient	 to	
make	something	x.	
We	 can	 logically	 define	 octagon, for	 example:	 a	 closed	 plane	 figure	
with	eight	straight	sides.	These	are	all	more	basic	concepts	that	you	
can	understand	without	knowing	what	an	octagon	is.	So,	you	can	use	
this	definition	to	learn	what	an	octagon	is,	without	experiencing	one	
first-hand.
We	 cannot,	 however,	 give	 a	 logical	 definition	 of	 anything	 phe-
nomenal.	This	goes	not	just	for	phenomenality	in	general	but	also	for	
the	 distinctive	 phenomenality	 of	 specific	 types	 of	 thoughts.	 We	 can-
not	logically	define	sensuous	redness,	 for	example.	The	only	way	to	
convey	what	sensuous	redness	is	like	is	to	point	one’s	attention	to	in-
stances	of	that	quality	in	one’s	own	experience,	which	is	to	define	it	
ostensively.	More	generally:
An	 ostensive	 definition of	 x is	 an	 attempt	 to	 convey	 to	
someone	what	x is by	pointing	their	attention	to	(instances	
of)	x.	
We	can	now	be	precise	about	the	sense	in	which	phenomenal	qualities	
are	primitive	and	indefinable:
x is	(epistemically)	primitive	just	in	case	x cannot	be	de-
fined	logically,	but	only	ostensively.
Descartes	is	in	line	with	the	consensus	that	phenomenal	qualities	
are	primitive	 in	this	sense.	Consider	this	passage	from	his	Search Af-
ter Truth, where	he	discusses	the	paradigmatically	phenomenal	quality	
that	is	(sensuous)	colour,	using	white	as	an	example:
There	are,	in	my	view,	some	things	which	are	made	more	
4. Attributing the Phenomenal View to Descartes
In	the	course	of	explaining	the	view	that	clarity	is	phenomenal,	we’ve	
already	seen	that	that	it	fits	with	various	things	Descartes	says.	We’ll	
now	see	that	his	adherence	to	the	phenomenal	view	is	confirmed	by	
five	new	lines	of	argument:	Like	phenomenal	qualities	in	general,	he	
treats	clarity	as	primitive	or	indefinable	(§4.1);	he	refers	to	clarity	with	
phenomenological	 terms	 (§4.2);	 he	 describes	 clarity	 with	 phenom-
enological	metaphors	(§4.3);	he	insists	that	clarity	requires	attention	
(§4.4);	and	he	identifies	perceptions	as	clear	while	it	remains	an	open	
question	whether	they	are	true	(§4.5).
4.1 Clarity Is Primitive
We’re	about	to	see	that	Descartes	regards	clarity	as	primitive,	in	a	cer-
tain	 sense.	 While	 the	 intentional	 reading	 does	 not	 account	 for	 this	
point,	the	phenomenal	reading	does.
Philosophers	 commonly	 observe	 that	 phenomenality	 “cannot	 be	
defined	in	more	basic	terms.	Like	many	other	concepts,	it	is	primitive 
and indefinable.	Our	only	option	is	to	define	the	concept	ostensively	…”	
(Smithies	2019:	4†).	What	does	this	mean?	Given	that	a	definition	of	x 
(and	distinctness)	are	“adverbials	notions”	which	qualify	the	act	rather	than	
the	object	or	content	of	perception.	But	I’m	not	sure	his	reading	respects	this	
observation.	He	writes:	“Clarity	and	distinctness	are	used	by	Descartes	as	ad-
verbs	to	emphasize	the	success	of	certain	perceptions	in	arriving	at	the	truth”	
(Lennon	 2008:	 171).	 On	 this	 reading,	 a	 perception	 of	 p	 is	 successful	—	and	
thus	clear	and	distinct	—	precisely	insofar	as	p is	true.	But	truth	is	not	adver-
bial.	 “S	 clearly	and	distinctly	perceives	 p”	 cannot	be	 replaced	with	 “S	 truly	
perceives	p”.	And	truth	is	a	property	of	the	content	of	a	perception,	not	the	act.	
We	can	say	that	an	act	of	perceiving	is	accurate	or	true,	but	only	in	virtue	of	
the	fact	that	its	content	is	true.	This	is	why,	in	§2,	I	cast	Lennon	as	advancing	
a	version	of	the	intentional	reading,	perhaps	malgré-lui.	
	 	 Responding	to	Lennon,	Smith	denies	that	clarity	itself	is	an	adverbial	qual-
ity,	though	he	grants	that	we	can	use	adverbs	to	describe	it	(Smith	2010:	75;	
Smith	2015a:	90).	Smith	could	agree	with	me	that	the	three	locutions	above	
mean	the	same	thing,	but	I	think	he	would	say	that	the	first	one	is	the	most	
apt,	insofar	as	it	might	seem	friendlier	to	his	view	that	clarity	is	a	property	of	
the	content	rather	than	the	act	of	perceiving.	I	would	reply	that,	even	in	the	
first	locution,	what	‘clear’	qualifies	is	not	the	content	p	by	itself,	but	the	way	p 
is	to the	perceiving	subject:	“p is	clear	to S”.
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Things	which	“we	cannot	know	about	unless	we	see	them”	(as	he	says	
in	 the	Search)	—	or	 things	which	do	not	admit	of	 “logical	definitions”	
(as	he	says	here	in	the	Principles)	—	are	primitive	in	the	sense	I	identi-
fied	above.	
Descartes	 gives	 at	 least	 four	 indications	 that	 clarity	 is	 primitive.	
First,	 when	 we	 consider	 Descartes’s	 list	 of	 primitives	—	including	
thought, doubt, and	certainty —	it	seems	like	clarity belongs	in	the	same	
category.	 Someone	 who	 insists	 that	 we	 can	 understand	 what	 doubt,	
thought,	and	certainty	are	only	by	“seeing”	or	reflecting	on	our	own	
states	of	doubt,	thought,	and	certainty	should	probably	also	hold	that	
we	can	understand	what	clarity	is	only	by	reflecting	on	our	own	states	
of	clarity.
Second,	one	could	argue	that,	for	Descartes,	certainty	in	particular	
is	 not	 just	 in	 the	 same	 category	 as	 clarity:	 it	 is clarity.	 Descartes	 of-
ten	uses	terms	for	‘certain’	(certus) and	‘clear’	(clarus, perspicuus) inter-
changeably.	In	a	prominent	strand	of	Latin	usage	going	back	to	Cicero,	
those	 terms	 are	 not	 only	 interchangeable	 but	 synonymous.38	 If	 Des-
cartes	follows	this	usage,	then,	when	he	says	that	certainty	is	primitive,	
he	is	saying,	in	other	words,	that	clarity	is	primitive.	While	this	point	is	
suggestive,	we	needn’t	put	weight	on	it	here.
For	in	another	passage	—	and	this	is	our	third	and	most	direct	bit	of	
evidence	—	Descartes	does	refer	to	clarity	by	name	as	he	indicates	that	
it	is	primitive:
I	ask	my	readers	to	ponder	all	the	examples	that	I	went	
through	 in	 my	 Meditations,	 both	 of	 clear	 and	 distinct	
38.	Before	Cicero,	Western	philosophy	as	we	know	it	was	conducted	exclusively	
in	Greek,	and	so	it	was	Cicero,	more	than	any	other	individual,	who	standard-
ized	Latin	usage	for	philosophical	discourse.	In	his	Academica, Cicero	renders	
dêlos	as	clarus (‘clear’	as	‘clear’)	and	adêlon as	incertum (‘unclear’	as	‘uncertain’).	
In	this	rendering,	‘clear’	and	‘uncertain’	are	antonyms,	so	‘clear’	and	‘certain’	
are	synonyms.	In	other	work	(Paul	forthcoming:	ch.	2),	I	argue	that	Descartes	
it	at	least	partly	through	Cicero	that	Descartes	encountered	the	epistemology	
of	the	ancient	Stoics,	who	coined	the	notion	of	clear	and	distinct	perception.	
My	phenomenological	reading	of	Cartesian	clarity	dovetails	with	‘internalist’	
readings	both	of	Stoic	clarity	(Nawar	2014,	Perin	2005)	and	of	late	medieval	
evidentia (Choi	2018).
obscure	by	our	attempts	 to	define	 them:	 since	 they	are	
very	simple	and	clear,	they	are	perceived	and	known	just	
on	their	own,	and	there	is	no	better	way	of	knowing	and	
perceiving	them.	Perhaps	some	of	the	most	serious	errors	
in	the	sciences	are	those	committed	by	those	who	try	to	
define	what	should	only	be	conceived	….	The	only	way	
we	can	learn	such	things	is	by	ourselves:	what	convinces	
us	of	them	is	simply	our own experience or awareness	—	that	
awareness	 or	 internal	 testimony	 which	 everyone	 expe-
riences	 within	 himself	 when	 he	 ponders	 such	 matters.	
Thus	it	would	be	pointless	trying	to	define,	for	someone	
totally	blind,	what	it	is	to	be	white:	in order to know what 
white is, all that is needed is to have one’s eyes open and to see 
white.	(AT	10:524*†)
Though	he	does	not	use	the	term	‘primitive’	here,	he	does	say,	 in	ef-
fect,	that	white	is	primitive.	We	cannot	understand	“what	white	is”	by	
defining	it	in	other	terms;	indeed,	attempting	to	define	it	would	only	
“[make	it]	more	obscure”.	We	can	understand	“what	white	is”	only	“on	
[its]	own”,	by	being	acquainted	with	white	 itself	as	 it	occurs	 in	 “our	
own	experience”	when	we	“see	white”,	which	is	why	“someone	totally	
blind”	has	no	way	of	learning	“what	white	is”.	
In	 the	 same	 passage	 of	 the	 Search,	 Descartes	 says	 that	 doubt and	
thought	are	also	primitive:	“[T]here	are	things	we	cannot	know	about	
unless	we	see	them.	In	order,	then,	to	know	what	doubt	and	thought	
are,	all	we	need	do	is	to	doubt	and	to	think”	(AT	10:525).	He	discusses	
primitives	again	in	the	corresponding	passage	of	the	Principles:	
I	have	often	noticed	that	philosophers	make	the	mistake	
of	employing	logical	definitions	in	an	attempt	to	explain	
what	was	already	very	simple	and	self-evident;	the	result	
is	that	they	only	make	matters	more	obscure.	(Pr. i.10,	AT 
8A:8)	
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(iii)	metaphors for	(complete)	clarity	—	i.e.	illumination;	
feeling	and	handling.
(iv)	an enabling condition	for	clarity	—	i.e.	attention.
(v)	 a cause of	 (sensory)	 clarity	—	i.e.	 forceful	 impact	 on	
sensory	organs.
(vi)	an effect	of	(complete)	clarity	—	i.e.	compelled	assent.
In	 his	 Meditations,	 Descartes	 leans	 most	 heavily	 on	 the	 first	 and	 pri-
mary	way	of	pointing	to	clarity,	which	is	to	get	you	to	have a	clear	and	
distinct	perception,	with	the	paradigm	example	of	the	cogito (AT	7:25),	
and	then	to	reflect	on	this	perception	so	as	to	notice its	evidential	qual-
ity:	“In	this	first	item	of	knowledge	there	is	simply	a	clear	and	distinct	
perception	of	what	I	am	asserting”	(AT	7:35).39 
Descartes	employs	the	other	ways	of	pointing	to	clarity	throughout	
the	 Meditations and	 in	 other	 works	 as	 well.	 Indeed,	 that	 is	 precisely	
what	 he	 is	 doing	 in	 the	 notoriously	 puzzling	 text	 where	 he	 defines	
clarity	in	Principles i.45:
I	call	 something	 ‘clear’	when	 it	 is	present	and	open	<Fr.	
manifest>	to	the	attentive	mind	—	just	as	we	say	that	we	
see	 something	 clearly	 when,	 being	 present	 to	 the	 eye’s	
gaze,	it	strikes	it	with	enough	force	and	openness	[Claram 
voco illam, quae menti attendenti praesens & aperta <Fr. mani-
feste> est: sicut ea clarè à nobis videri dicimus, quae, oculo in-
tuenti praesentia, satis fortiter & apertè illum movent].	 (AT 
8A:22*)
39.	The	Meditations	is	specially	written	to	help	you	gain	clarity	for	yourself.	The	
way	it	does	so,	I	would	argue,	is	partly	thanks	to	its	unique	style,	which	appro-
priates	literary	strategies	from	the	traditional	genre	of	spiritual	meditations.	
On	the	style	of	the	Meditations see	Cunning	(2010),	Garber	(1986:	91–7,	113	
n	36),	Gilson	(1975:	186),	Kosman	(1986),	 Janowski	(2000:	109	ff.),	Marlies	
(1978),	Mercer	(2014;	2016);	Nolan	(2000)	and	Rorty	(1986).	On	Descartes’s	
debt	 to	 the	 meditational	 tradition,	 see	 Hatfield	 (1985;	 1986;	 2003),	 Mercer	
(2014;	2016),	Secada	(2013),	and	Vendler	(1989).
perception,	 and	 of	 obscure	 and	 confused	 perception,	
and	 thereby	 accustom	 themselves	 to	 distinguishing what 
is clearly apprehended from what is obscure.	 This	 is	 some-
thing	that	it	is	easier	to	learn	by	examples	than	by	rules,	
and	I	think	that	in	the	Meditations	I	explained,	or	at	least	
touched	on,	all	the	relevant	examples.	(2O/R,	Geometri-
cal	Appendix,	AT	7:164†*)
The	difference	between	what	is	“clear”	(or	“clearly	apprehended”)	and	
what	is	“obscure”	is	to	be	learned	“by	examples”	rather	than	“by	rules”.	
There	 is	a	close	connection	between	rules	and	 logical	definitions.	 If	
there	 is	 a	 logical	 definition	 of	 x,	 then	 it	 can	 be	 used	 to	 formulate	 a	
rule	for	determining	whether	or	not	something	is	x. The	logical	defi-
nition	of	octagon,	for	example,	yields	an	obvious	rule	for	determining	
whether	 or	 not	 something	 is	 an	 octagon:	 Check	 whether	 or	 not	 it’s	
a	closed	plane	figure	with	eight	straight	sides.	If	there	were	a	logical	
definition	 of	 clarity,	 there	 would	 be	 a	 corresponding	 rule	 for	 deter-
mining	whether	something	is	clear	as	opposed	to	being	obscure.	But	
Descartes	says	the	difference	between	clarity	and	obscurity	is	not	to	
be	 learned	 by	 rules,	 and	 so	 not	 by	 logical	 definitions,	 but	 rather	 by	
examples	—	which	is	just	what	it	means	for	something	to	be	primitive.
Fourth,	even	if	Descartes	had	never	said	that	clarity	is	primitive,	he	
treats clarity	as	primitive,	in	that	he	never	gives	it	a	logical	definition.	
He	only	points	to	it.	Throughout	his	writings,	he	points	to	clarity	in	six	
different	ways,	by	identifying:
(i)	objects or contents	that	can	be	perceived	clearly	—	i.e.	
the	 cogito,	 various	 other	 axioms	 or	 first	 principles	 that	
can	be	intuited,	as	well	as	various	theorems	that	can	be	
deduced.
(ii)	 synonyms	 for	 ‘clear’	—	i.e.	 (phenomenally)	 ‘pres-
ent’,	‘open	[to	view]’,	‘manifest’,	‘evident’,	‘perspicuous’	or	
‘transparent’;	and,	for	sensory	clarity,	‘lively	and	vivid’.	
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define	clarity	logically	in	terms	of	another	property	(viz. truth,	or	truth	
regarding	 essences	 or	 natures).	 In	 contrast,	 the	 primitive	 nature	 of	
clarity	fits	very	well	with	the	phenomenal	reading,	because	Descartes	
treats	phenomenal	qualities	as	primitive.	He	cannot	give	a	logical	defi-
nition	of	clarity	any	more	than	he	can	for	a	sensuous	colour.	All	he	can	
do	is	point	your	attention	to	it	as	you	experience	it	for	yourself.	And	
when	you	do	look	where	he	points,	what	you’ll	find,	he	trusts,	is	the	
phenomenal	quality	of	something	striking	you	as	true.
4.2 Phenomenological Terms for Clarity
Recall	the	first	clause	in	the	definition	of	clarity:	“I	call	something	‘clear’	
when	it	is	present	and	open	<Fr.	manifest>	to	the	attentive	mind”	(Pr. 
i.45*).	Three	of	these	terms	—	‘present’,	‘open’,	and	‘manifest’	(praesens, 
aperta, manifeste)	—	are	used	as	synonyms	for	‘clear’	(clarus).	
As	we	noted	in	§3.1,	‘present’	evokes	the	phenomenal	quality	you	
experience	when	an	object	or	content	 is	presented	to	you	as	real	or	
true.	 When	 something	 is	 present	 to	 you	 in	 this	 way,	 it	 is,	 in	 other	
words,	‘manifest’	to	you	or	‘open’	to	you	(in	the	sense	of	being	open	to	
your	view	as	opposed	to	being	‘hidden’	or	obscured	from	your	view).	
Elsewhere	he	describes	the	same	quality	by	speaking	of	what	is	 ‘evi-
dent’	or	‘transparent’	(evidens, perspicuus)	to	you.42	While	he	reserves	
these	 terms	 for	 completely	 clear	 intellection,	 we’ve	 seen	 that	 in	 the	
case	of	sensory	clarity	he	speaks	of	what	is	‘lively	and	vivid’	(vividae & 
expressae)	to	you.
At	least	some	of	Descartes’s	synonyms	for	‘clear’	have	unmistakable	
overtones	of	phenomenality.	Insofar	as	these	terms	refer	to	qualities	
of	perceptions,	it	is	hard	to	know	what	‘vivid’	or	‘lively’	could	mean	if	
they	don’t	describe	a	phenomenal	quality,	and,	taken	in	context,	the	
same	is	true	for	terms	like	‘manifest’	and	‘evident’.	It	should	be	empha-
sized	too	that	‘clear’	itself	has	a	definite	phenomenal	resonance.	This	
42.	 For	example,	he	says	that	none	God’s	purposes	are	“open”	to	us;	“all	are	equal-
ly	hidden”	(AT	7:375).	There	is	an	abundance	of	texts	where	clarus is	substi-
tuted	with	manifestus (e.g.	AT	7:16,	40,	120),	evidens	(e.g.	AT	7:47,	58–9,	147–8),	
or	perspicuus (e.g.	AT	7:62,	147–8),	or	vividae & expressae	(recall	§1.2).
This	isn’t	good	for	the	intentional	reading.	If	Descartes	defines	clarity	
in	terms	of	truth	(or	essences	or	natures),	why	doesn’t	he	say	so	when	
he	 defines	 clarity?	 Proponents	 of	 the	 intentional	 reading	 downplay	
this	passage.40	But	it	appears	in	a	major	work	that	he	published	twice,	
and	it	is	the	only	sentence	in	the	entire	corpus	where	he	explicitly	says	
what	he	means	by	‘clear’.	If	there	is	one	sentence	to	which	an	interpre-
tation	of	Cartesian	clarity	must	answer,	this	is	it.
So	let’s	dig	into	it.	It	has	two	clauses,	separated	by	the	dash.	In	the	
first	clause,	Descartes	glosses	clarity	in	general,	and	then	he	turns	to	
the	familiar	case	of	visual	clarity.
The	adjective	“clear”	applies	to	a	content	or	object	here,	but	notice	
the	dative	construction:	menti attendenti, “to	the	attentive	mind.” Clarity	
isn’t	just	a	matter	of	the	object	itself	but	of	how	that	object	is	presented	
to the subject. Reinforcing	 this	point	 is	 the	 fact	 that	Descartes	moves	
freely	here,	as	he	often	does,	between	the	adjective	“clear”	as	it	quali-
fies	the	perceived	object	and	the	adverb	“clearly”	as	it	qualifies	the	act	
of	perceiving.	So	the	object	is	not	clear	full-stop;	it’s	clear	to	the	subject	
who	perceives	it	clearly.
While	 this	 sentence	 is	 conventionally	 referred	 to	 as	 Descartes’s	
definition	of	clarity,	we	should	be	careful	how	we	define	 ‘definition’.	
It	is	not	a	logical	definition;	it	doesn’t	provide	a	rule	or	independent	
criteria	for	identifying	clarity.	Those	who	expect	that	kind	of	thing	are	
naturally	disappointed.41	Instead	of	analyzing	clarity	in	terms	of	other	
properties,	 this	 sentence	 defines	 clarity	 by	 pointing	 to	 it.	 It	 does	 so	
in	three	of	the	six	ways	mentioned	above:	by	identifying	an	enabling 
condition	for	any	clear	perception	(i.e.,	attention);	synonyms	for	‘clear’	
(i.e.	‘present’,	‘open’,	‘manifest’);	and	a typical cause of	visual	clarity	in	
particular	(i.e.,	forceful	stimulation	of	the	eye).	
The	fact	that	Descartes	denies	that	clarity	can	be	defined	logically	in	
terms	of	another	property	is	a	problem	for	intentional	readings,	which	
40.	See,	for	example,	Lennon	(2008:	168),	who	dismisses	it	without	quoting	it.
41.	 Recall	the	remarks	of	Markie,	Della	Rocca,	and	Shapiro,	quoted	in	the	intro-
duction.	 I	 agree	 with	 LoLordo	 that	 the	 definition	 “would	 not	 help	 anyone	
understand	clarity	and	distinctness	from	the	outside”	(2005:	59	n.	15).
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More	evidence	that	clarity	is	phenomenal	comes	from	Descartes’s	
correspondence	with	Silhon,	in	which	he	elaborates	on	his	very	para-
digm	of	 clarity	—	the	 intuition	of	 the	 cogito —	in	a	way	 that	explicitly	
highlights	 its	 phenomenality.	 In	 a	 letter	 to	 Descartes,	 Silhon	 con-
tends	 that,	 because	 we	 are	 embodied,	 we	 are	 so	 prone	 to	 obscurity	
and	 confusion	 that	 we	 cannot	 have	 intuitive	 knowledge	 during	 our	
earthly	lives	and	must	await	the	beatific	vision	of	God	in	the	afterlife.	
In	reply,	Descartes	grants	that	whatever	clarity	we	enjoy	in	this	life	is	
fleeting	and	surely	pales	 in	comparison	 to	 the	 “pure,	constant,	clear,	
certain,	effortless,	and	ever-present	 light”	of	 the	“beatific	vision”	(To	
[Silhon],	March	or	April	 1648,	AT	5:136–7).	But	he	 insists	 that,	even	
here	and	now	in	our	Earthly	lives,	we	are	nevertheless	capable	of	intu-
iting	truths	clearly	enough	to	apprehend	them.	He	tries	to	get	Silhon	
to	recognize	that	Silhon	himself	has	such	clear	intuitions,	and	the	way	
he	 does	 so,	 notably,	 is	 by	 pointing	 to	 what it feels like to	 experience	
such	clarity.	He	points	to	this	quality	with	two	sensory	metaphors:	one	
visual,	the	other	tactile.	The	visual	metaphor	is,	again,	that	of	illumina-
tion:	clear	intuition,	he	writes,	“is	an	illumination	of	the	mind”	(Ibid.).	
He	then	introduces	the	tactile	metaphor	to	describe	his	prime	example	
of	clear	perception:
I	agree	that	such	illumination	is	somewhat	obscured	by	
the	soul’s	mingling	with	 the	body;	but	still	 it	gives	us	a	
primary,	 unearned	 and	 certain	 apprehension	 which	 we	
touch	 [touchons]	 with	 our	 mind	 with	 more	 confidence	
than	we	give	to	the	testimony	of	our	eyes.	You	will	surely	
admit	that	you	are	less	certain	of	the	presence	of	the	ob-
jects	 you	 see	 than	 of	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 proposition	 ‘I	 am	
thinking,	therefore	I	exist.’	Now	this	apprehension	is	not	
the	work	of	your	reasoning	or	information	passed	on	to	
you	by	teachers;	it	is	something	that	your	mind	sees,	feels	
and	 handles	 [la voit, la sent & la manie];	 and	 although	
your	 imagination	 insistently	 mixes	 itself	 up	 with	 your	
thoughts	and	lessens	their	clarity	by	trying	to	clothe	them	
is	 even	 more	 obvious	 in	 the	 original	 Latin	 and	 French,	 where	 both	
clarus	and	clair	connote	bright,	vivid,	vibrant,	or	loud,	and	obscurus and	
obscur connote	dark,	dim,	 faint,	or	quiet.	The	authors	of	 the	Second	
Objections find	 it	natural	 to	speak	of	 truths	 that	are	 “as	clear	as	 the	
sunlight”	—	a	 phrase	 that	 Descartes	 repeats	 with	 approval	 in	 his	 re-
sponse	(AT	7:126,	146).	In	French,	when	a	truth	is	evident	or	manifest	
to	us,	we	can	say,	“C’est clair comme le jour” — “It’s	as	bright	as	day.”	
4.3 Phenomenological Metaphors for Clarity
Phenomenality	lends	itself	to	metaphors	and	similes.	In	trying	to	con-
vey	what	it’s	like	to	have	a	given	kind	of	thought,	we	naturally	resort	
to	saying,	well	…	what	it’s	like. As we’ve	already	seen,	Descartes	uses	
a	famous	metaphor	to	convey	what	it’s	like	to	experience	intellectual	
clarity	at	its	best.	He	likens	it	to	the	experience	of	light,	a	kind	of	men-
tal	illumination — a	metaphor	that	is	all	the	more	apt	given	the	conno-
tation	of	brightness	in	clarus and	clair. It’s	no	coincidence	that	another	
term	for	clear	is	‘lucid’,	from	lucere	(‘shine’)	and	lux	(‘light’).	When	you	
employ	your	intellect	well,	Descartes	says,	truth	is	revealed	to	you	“by	
a	certain	inner	light”	which	he	calls	“the	natural	light”	or	the	“light	of	
reason”,	explaining	that	this	“light	 in	the	intellect	means	transparent	
clarity	of	cognition”	(3O/R, AT	7:192).	If	phenomenality	is,	as	we	say,	
the	“lights-on”	subjective	quality	of	what	it’s	like	to	have	a	certain	kind	
of	thought,	then	having	clear	intellection	of	a	truth	is	like	blasting	it	
with	your	mental	floodlights.43
43.	 We	can	unpack	the	light	metaphor	in	terms	of	the	structure	of	perception.	A	
perception	is	a	relation	between	subject	and	object,	between	perceiver	and	
thing	perceived. Descartes	holds	that	by	its	very	nature,	every	perception	is	
endowed	with	intentionality	in	relation	to	its	object,	as	well	as	consciousness	
whereby	it	displays	that	object	to	the	perceiving	subject.	Consciousness	im-
bues	perception	with	phenomenality;	it	is	the	light	of	the	mind	(Barth	2016;	
Lähteenmäki	2007;	Simmons	2012).	So	in	perceiving	this	page,	you	are	con-
scious	of	this	page	—	it	is	something	you	experience.	Whereas	the	intentional	
reading	locates	clarity	in	the	object	alone,	I	locate	clarity	in	consciousness	of	
the	object. Everything	we	perceive	is	in	the	light	of	consciousness	to	some	
degree,	but	while	the	light	shines	brightly	(clearly)	on	some	things,	it	shines	
only	dimly	(obscurely)	on	others.
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God,]	if	I	concentrate	carefully,	all	this	is	quite	evident	….	
But	when	I	relax	my	concentration	…	it’s	not	so	easy	for	
me	 to	 remember	 how	 I	 arrived	 at	 that	 conclusion.	 (M3, 
AT	7:47†)	
It’s	quite	clear	 to	anyone	who	attentively	 considers	 the	
nature	of	time	…	that	creating	something	and	conserving	
it	in	existence	are	exercises	of	the	same	power.	(M3, AT 
7:49†;	cf.	AT	7:45)45
When	 Descartes	 prepares	 to	 introduce	 or	 reinforce	 a	 clear	 (and	 dis-
tinct)	perception,	he	stresses	the	need	to	concentrate	or	pay	attention.	
Furthermore,	he	says	the	degree	to	which	he	perceives	things	clearly	
depends	on	the	degree	to	which	he	attends	to	them	or	on	how	care-
fully	he	concentrates	on	them.	Note	that	the	attention	required	is	not	
a	 higher-order	 act.	 In	 order	 to	 perceive	 p	 clearly,	 what	 you	 have	 to	
concentrate	on	is	p	itself,	not	your	perception	of	p.	
The	fact	that	clarity	requires	attention	is	yet	another	mark	against	
the	 intentional	 reading,	according	 to	which	an	 idea	 is	 clear	and	dis-
tinct	just	in	virtue	of	having	the	right	kind	of	content.	In	his	defense	of	
that	reading,	Kurt	Smith	notes	that	innate	ideas	have	what	he	takes	to	
be	the	right	kind	of	content.	Thus,	he	infers	that	“Descartes’s	position	
is	 that	 innate	 ideas	 are	 clear	 and distinct”	 (2001:	 292).	 While	 Smith	
regards	this	implication	as	a	virtue	of	his	reading,	I	see	it	as	a	problem.	
In	Descartes’s	view,	we	always	have	innate	ideas	—	of	God,	extension,	
number,	 etc.	—	even	 when	 we’re	 not	 attending	 to	 them,	 and	 when	
we’re	not	attending	to	them,	they	can’t	be	clear,	much	less	clear	and 
distinct.	It’s	not	enough	that	we’re	born	with	ideas	that	have	the	right	
kind	of	content.	“We	have	to	form	[clear	and]	distinct	ideas”	(AT	3:272†),	
45.	 Thanks	to	Alison	Simmons	for	suggesting	these	texts.	While	these	examples	
concern	intellectual	clarity,	attention	is	also	required	for	sensory	clarity.	See,	
e.g.,	Rule	9,	where	Descartes	“compares	mental	intuition	with	ordinary	vision”	
and	describes	how	focused	attention	enhances	both	(AT	10:400–1).
with	shapes,	it	 is	nevertheless	a	proof	of	the	capacity	of	
our	soul	for	receiving	intuitive	apprehension	[une connois-
sance intuitive]	from	God.	(Ibid.*†)
The	visual	language	(“sees”)	reminds	us	that	Descartes	elsewhere	re-
fers	to	the	faculty	of	intellectual	intuition	as	“the	mind’s	eye”	(e.g.	AT 
7:25),	and	with	this	new	tactile	language	he	depicts	that	same	faculty	
as,	so	to	speak,	the	mind’s	hand.	By	saying	that	when	you	clearly	in-
tuit	a	truth	you	“touch”	and	“feel	and	handle”	that	truth,	Descartes	is	
expressly	highlighting	 the	 feeling	of	 intuition;	we	might	similarly	de-
scribe	it	as	the	feeling	of	“grasping”	or	“getting	hold	of”	a	truth.	He	is,	
in	 effect,	 rehearsing	 the	 strategy	 of	 the	 Meditations:	 using	 the	 cogito 
as	his	paradigm	example,	he	 tries	 to	get	Silhon	first	of	all	 to	have	a	
(completely)	clear	perception,	and	then	to	reflect	on	it	so	as	to	notice	
its	clarity	—	notice	how	it	feels	to	grasp	the	truth,	what	it’s	like	when	
the	truth	is	illuminated.44 
4.4 Clarity Requires Attention
Something	can	be	clear	only	“to	the	attentive	mind”	—	a	requirement	
that	is	stated	not	only	in	Principles	i.45	but	also	(twice)	in	Descartes’s	
characterization	of	completely	clear	intuition	in	the	Rules (AT	10:336).	
In	 the	 Second	 Replies,	 after	 recapping	 some	 important	 claims	 from	
the	Meditations,	Descartes	asserts	 that	 “all	 this	 is	manifest	 if	we	give	
the	matter	our	careful	attention”	(AT	7:120).	Within	the	Meditations,	he	
repeatedly	illustrates	the	need	to	attend	to	or	concentrate	on	things	in	
order	to	perceive	them	clearly:	
[My perception	 of	 the	 wax	 can	 be] imperfect	 and	 con-
fused,	as	it	was	before,	or	clear	and	distinct,	as	it	is	now,	
depending	on	the	degree	to	which	I	attend [minus vel ma-
gis … attendo]	to	what	the	wax	consists	in.	(M2, AT	7:31*†)
[Upon	completing	the	first	argument	for	the	existence	of	
44.	 On	uses	of	 the	 light	metaphor	more	broadly	 in	the	17th	century,	see	Jolley	
(1990).
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But	it	does	make	sense	to	question	the	veracity	of	clear	and	distinct	
perceptions.	It	is	the	ultimate	skeptical	question,	and	Descartes	takes	
it	very	seriously.	At	the	beginning	of	Meditation	Three,	when	he	notes	
that	what	assures	him	of	the	truth	of	the	cogito is	nothing	other	than	
his	clear	and	distinct	perception	of	it,	he	queries	whether	he	“can	now	
lay	it	down	as	a	general	rule	that	whatever	I	perceive	very	clearly	and	
distinctly	is	true”	(AT	7:35).	In	the	next	two	paragraphs	he	concludes	
that	he	cannot	do	so	yet.	He	concedes	that,	for	all	he	knows	so	far,	God	
could	be	a	deceiver,	and	could	“bring	it	about	that	I	go	wrong	even	in	
those	matters	which	I	think	I	intuit	utterly	clearly”	(AT	7:35*).	In	order	
to	 dispel	 this	doubt,	he	must	establish	 the	Truth	Rule,	 and	 in	order	
to	do	that,	he	“must	examine	whether	there	is	a	God,	and,	if	there	is,	
whether	he	can	be	deceiver.	For	if	I	do	not	apprehend	this,	 it	seems	
that	I	can	never	be	fully	certain	about	anything	else”	(AT	7:35*).	
Pursuing	this	examination,	Descartes	goes	on	to	argue	that	indeed	
there	is	a	God,	and	that	God	cannot be	a	deceiver.	From	there	he	pro-
ceeds	 into	 Meditation	 Four	—	titled	 “Truth	 and	 Falsity”	—	where	 he	
marshals	the	following	argument	through	a	thicket	of	objections:	God	
cannot	be	a	deceiver;	God	would	be	a	deceiver	if	God	allowed	indubi-
table	perceptions	to	be	false;	clear	and	distinct	perceptions	are	indu-
bitable;	so,	God	must	guarantee	that	clear	and	distinct	perceptions	are	
true	(=	the	Truth	Rule).49	 In	short,	Descartes’s	quest	is	largely	driven	
by	the	skeptical	question	of	whether	clear	and	distinct	perceptions	are	
true,	and	he	has	to	work	very	hard	to	answer	it	in	the	affirmative.	None	
of	this	would	makes	sense	if	clear	and	distinct	perceptions	were	true	
by	definition,	as	the	intentional	reading	makes	them	out	to	be.
On	the	phenomenal	reading,	by	contrast,	it	does	make	sense.	The	
skeptical	question	amounts	to	this:	When	things	are	compellingly	pre-
sented	to	me	as	true,	are	they	really	true?	That	question	is	meaningful,	
and	answering	‘yes’	to	it	is	no	trivial	matter.
49.	 We	can	remain	neutral	here	on	which	notion	of	indubitability	drives	this	ar-
gument.	 Some	 scholars	 say	 it’s	 psychological	 indubitability	 (Gewirth	 1941;	
Loeb	1992;	Newman	2007;	Newman	2019:	§5.3);	others	say	it’s	rational	indu-
bitability	(Della	Rocca	2006;	2011).
Descartes	stresses,	and	what	that	requires,	minimally,	is	that	we	give	
them	due	attention.46 
While	the	need	for	attention	clashes	with	the	intentional	reading,	it	
coheres	nicely	with	my	alternative.	For	just	like	clarity,	attention	itself	
admits	of	an	adverbial	treatment	and	invites	the	phenomenally-laden	
metaphor	of	light.	To	perceive	something	clearly,	you	have	to	perceive	
it	in	a	certain	way:	“attentively”	(AT	7:49).	You	have	to	bring	it	into	the	
spotlight	of	attention.47
4.5 The Truth Rule Is Not Trivial
The	 intentional	 reading	 defines	 clarity	 and	 distinctness	 in	 terms	 of	
truth	(or	at	least	truth	with	respect	to	the	essences	or	natures	of	things).	
On	this	reading,	clear	and	distinct	perceptions	are	true	by	definition.	
If	 this	 were	 correct,	 the	 Truth	 Rule	—	that	 clear	 and	 distinct	 percep-
tions	are	always	true	—	would	be	trivial	tautology.	Lennon	embraces	
this	result:	“Descartes	takes	the	truth	rule	of	clarity	and	distinctness	to	
be	trivially	true”	(2008:	173).	On	his	interpretation,	it	would	be	utterly	
incoherent	to	ask	whether	clear	and	distinct	perceptions	are	true.	That	
would	be	like	asking	whether	circles	are	shapes,	or	whether	bachelors	
are	unmarried48	—	it	makes	no	sense.	
46.	 Smith	does	note	that	attention	is	“connected	to	clarity”	(2001:	284),	but	one	
problem,	just	noted,	is	that	this	goes	against	his	claim	that	innate	ideas	are	
always	clear,	since	we	have	them	even	without	attention.	Another	problem	is	
that	Smith	misconstrues	the	connection	between	clarity	and	attention	when	
he	adopts	Nelson’s	proposal	that	things	which	are	clear	are	“attention	grab-
bers”	 (Smith	 2001:301,	 citing	 Nelson	 1996:	 24).	 Some	 things	 become	 clear	
to	us	when	they	grab	our	attention,	as	 in	 the	case	of	 intense	pain	or	other	
salient	stimuli.	But	other	 things,	especially	abstract	 intellectual	matters,	do	
not	grab	our	attention,	and	Descartes	stresses	that	we	have	to	attend	to	them	
voluntarily	and	sometimes	with	difficulty	 in	order	 to	perceive	them	clearly	
(AT	7:47;	AT	8A:37).	
47.	 Descartes’s	treatment	of	attention	is	interesting	in	its	own	right.	See	Barrier	
(2017),	Brown	(2007),	Dubouclez	(2017),	and	Hatfield	(2009;	2017).
48.	 Or	 to	 adapt	 Lennon’s	 own	 comparisons,	 it	 would	 be	 like	 asking	 whether	
someone	who	has	successfully	sought	a	thimble	has	found	it,	or	whether	a	
doctor	who	has	successfully	treated	a	patient	has	cured	him	(2008:	173).
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I	call	a	perception	‘distinct’	when,	as	well	as	being	clear,	it	
is	so	sharply	separated	from	all	other	perceptions	that	it	
contains	within	itself	only what is clear [Distinctam autem 
illam, quæ, cum clara sit, ab omnibus aliis ita sejuncta est et 
præcisa, ut nihil plane aliud, quam quod clarum est, in se con-
tineat].	(AT	8A:22)
Clarity	is	more	fundamental.	Distinctness	is	defined	in	terms	of	clarity.	
Moreover,	distinctness	 is	defined	negatively,	not	as	clarity	combined	
with	some	additional	 feature,	but	as	clarity	 in the absence of	—	“sharp-
ly	separated”	or	literally	“cut	off”	and	“separated”	(sejuncta et praecise)	
from	—	anything	unclear.	Notice	the	double-negation:	a	perception	is	
distinct	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it’s	 not	 contaminated	 by	 what	 is	 not clear.	
Distinctness	is	simply	the	purest	case	of	clarity,	obtaining	when	a	per-
ception	“contains	within	itself	only what is clear”	—	when	it	is	wholly	or	
completely	clear.	This	bears	emphasis:	
(1)	A	distinct	perception	is	a	completely clear perception.	
Within	Principles i.45,	Descartes	also	says:
(2)	A	perception	which	can	serve	as	the	basis	for	a	certain	
and	indubitable	judgement	needs	to	be	not merely clear 
but also distinct.	(AT	8A:22*)
If	I	have	interpreted	distinctness	correctly,	then,	it	should	follow	that:
(3)A	perception	which	can	serve	as	the	basis	for	a	certain	
and	indubitable	judgement	needs	to	be	completely clear. 
[from	1,	2]
And	that	is,	indeed,	what	Descartes	says:
It	 is	 clear	 that	 we	 do	 not	 have	 this	 kind	 of	 certainty	 in	
cases	where	our	perception	is	even the slightest bit obscure	
or	confused;	for	such	obscurity,	whatever its degree,	is	quite	
sufficient	 to	make	us	have	doubts	 in	 such	cases.	 (2O/R, 
AT	7:145†)
5. Obscurity, Confusion, and Distinctness
It’s	appropriate	that	we’ve	examined	clarity	extensively,	because	Des-
cartes	defines	the	other	perceptual	qualities	—	obscurity,	distinctness,	
and	confusion	—	in	terms	of	clarity.
Take	obscurity.	Clarity	and	obscurity	are	contraries.	More	precisely,	
since	they	are	scalar,	they	are	logical	complements:	more	clarity	means	
less	 obscurity,	 and	 vice	 versa.	 But	 there	 is	 an	 asymmetry	 between	
them:	 obscurity	 is	 the	 absence	 of	 clarity,	 not	 vice	 versa.50	 Descartes	
is	part	of	a	long,	broadly	Augustinian	tradition	that	posits	this	kind	of	
asymmetry	between	certain	contraries	(AT	7:55,	374).	Within	this	tra-
dition,	evil,	non-being,	 imperfection,	and	darkness,	 for	example,	are	
not	positive	features.	Evil	is	the	absence	of	goodness,	non-being	is	the	
absence	of	being,	imperfection	is	the	absence	of	perfection,	and	dark-
ness	is	the	absence	of	light.	That	last	example	is	particularly	instruc-
tive.	We’ve	seen	that	clarity,	at	its	best,	is	a	floodlight	in	the	mind,	and	
so	obscurity	 is	 simply	 the	absence	of	 that	 illumination.	Obscurity	 is	
not	a	positive	feature;	it’s	just	the	absence	of	clarity.51
Now	for	distinctness	and	its	contrary,	confusion.	Here	once	again	
is	how	Descartes	defines	distinctness	after	defining	clarity	in	Principles 
i.45:
50.	Martha	 Bolton	 makes	 a	 similar	 suggestion	 when	 she	 says	 that	 obscurity	
and	confusion	are	“privations”	of	clarity	and	distinctness	(Bolton	1986:	389).	
While	scholastic	philosophers	distinguished	between	at	least	three	different	
kinds	 of	 absences	 or	 negative	 entities	—	‘lacks’,	 ‘negations’,	 and	 ‘privations’	
(see	Embry	2015)	—	I	remain	neutral	on	those	finer	classifications	here.
51.	 Closely	connected	with	obscurity	is	Descartes’s	notion	of	“material	falsity”.	A	
materially	false	perception	or	idea	is	one	that	provides	“subject-matter	for	er-
ror”	or	for	“formal	falsity”	(4O/R, AT	7:232).	The	“essence	of	error	[formam er-
roris]”	consists	in	the	“incorrect	use	of	free	will”	(M4, AT	7:60).	In	the	context	
of	the	Meditations,	you	use	your	will	improperly	just	in	case	you	assent	to	a	
perception	that	is	obscure	or	confused	—	even	if	that	perception	“happens	to	
be	true”	(Ibid.).	Confusion	entails	obscurity,	as	we’ll	see.	Thus,	Descartes	says	
that	“an	idea’s	material	 falsity	…	arises	solely	from	the	obscurity	of	the	idea”	
(4O/R, AT	7:234†).	So,	a	perception	is	materially	false	just	in	case	it	is	obscure.	
For	more	support	for	this	proposal,	see	Naaman-Zauderer	(2010).
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an	additional	form”,	provided	by	the	will’s	assent	(M3,	AT	7:37).	The	
contents	of	the	perceptions	involved	may	be	formulated	as	follows:	
(c)	very	clear	perception: a pain exists.	 
(o)	obscure	perception:	something in my foot exists. 
(c)	and	(o)	fused	together:	a pain in my foot exists.
To	explain	this,	I	will	adapt	an	expository	device	from	an	excellent	es-
say	by	Alan	Nelson	(1997)	and	use	diagrams	as	follows:	each	oval	is	an	
act	of	perception;	what	is	printed	inside	each	oval	is	the	content	of	that	
perception;	and	a	white	interior	indicates	clarity	while	shades	of	grey	
mark	 degrees	 of	 obscurity.	 If	 the	 perception	 of	 pain	 were	 clear	 and	
distinct,	it	would	be	sharply	separated	from	the	obscure	perception	of	
the	foot	so	as	to	be	thoroughly	clear.
But	this	is	not	how	we	ordinarily	perceive	the	pain.	We	don’t	just	per-
ceive	pain	and something	in	the	foot.	We	perceive	pain	as something	
in	the	foot:
We	generally	regard	[pain]	not	as	being	in	the	mind	alone,	
or	 in	our	perception,	but	as being in the hand or foot or in 
some other part of our body.	(Pr. i.67†)
Our	 perception	 of	 the	 pain	 and	 our	 perception	 of	 something	 in	 the	
foot	are	not	separated	but	are	fused	into	an	indiscriminate	whole.	
This	 is	 just	one	 instance	of	a	persistent	syndrome	of	confusion:	 “All	
our	ideas	of	what	belongs	to	the	mind	[i.e.,	thoughts]	have	up	till	now	
[before	 the	Meditations]	been	very	confused	and	mixed	up	with	our	
A	perception	provides	certainty	only	when	it	 is	completely	clear,	un-
marred	by	even	the	slightest	scintilla	of	obscurity.
This	point	is	crucial	because,	as	Descartes	says	in	the	very	next	ar-
ticle,	“a	perception	can	be	clear	without	being	distinct”	(Pr.	i.46)	—	i.e.	
clear	but	confused.	In	other	words,	a	perception	can	be	clear	—	more	
precisely,	 it	 can	 be	 relatively	 clear,	 or	 even	 very clear	—	without	 be-
ing	 completely clear.	Even	when	a	perception	 is	very	clear,	 it	may	be	
confused	with	an	obscure	perception,	such	that	it	is	not	distinct,	not	
completely	clear.	To	illustrate	this	point,	Descartes	describes	the	way	
people	commonly	or	ordinarily	perceive	pain:	
For	 example,	 when	 someone	 feels	 an	 intense	 pain,	 [c] 
the perception he has of this pain is	 indeed	 very	 clear,	 but	
is	not	always	distinct.	For	people	commonly	confuse this 
perception with [o] an obscure judgement	 they	 make	 con-
cerning	the	nature	of	something	which	they	think	exists	
in	the	painful	spot	and	which	they	suppose	to	resemble	
the	sensation	of	pain;	but	in	fact	it	is	the	sensation	alone	
which	 they	perceive	clearly.	Hence	a	perception	can	be	
clear	without	being	distinct,	but	not	distinct	without	be-
ing	clear.	(Pr. i.46,	AT	8A:22†)
Two	perceptions	are	“commonly”	(vulgò)	or	“ordinarily”	(ordinairement)	
confused	—	literally	 “fused	 together”	 (confusio).	 One	 of	 them	 is	 (c)	 a	
very	 clear	 perception	 of	 pain.	 Importantly,	 the	 object	 of	 this	 percep-
tion	—	pain	—	is	a	sensation,	which,	for	Descartes,	is	a	kind	of	thought,	
existing	only	in	the	mind.	Pain	and	other	sensations	are	caused	by	the	
body	but	they	are	not	in the	body,	so	the	perception	of	pain	is	not	a	
perception	of	the	body.	Rather,	it’s	an	inner	perception	of	something	
within	one’s	own	mind,	a	perception	which	Descartes	goes	on	to	iden-
tify	as	 “inner	consciousness	[intimè conscii]”	 (Pr.	 i.66,	AT	8A:32*).	 In	
this	example,	one’s	(c)	very	clear	perception	of	one’s	mind	is	not	dis-
tinct,	because	it’s	fused	with	(o)	an	obscure	perception	of	one’s	body.	
Descartes	calls	the	obscure	perception	an	“obscure	judgement”	here,	
but	a	 judgement	 is a	perception,	 in	his	view:	 it’s	 a	perception	 “with	
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believe	it	to	be	true.	But	my	nature	is	also	such	that	I	can-
not	fix	my	mental	vision	continually	on	the	same	thing,	
so	as	to	keep	perceiving	it	clearly.	(M5,	AT	7:69†;	cf.	2O/R, 
AT	7:125,	141)
Given	that	clarity	does	not	entail	distinctness,	why	does	Descartes	so	
often	just	say	‘clear(ly)’	when	he	also	means	‘distinct(ly)’?
If	 distinctness	 were	 an	 additional	 feature,	 this	 usage	 would	 be	
problematic.	But	since	a	distinct	perception	is	just	a	completely	clear	
perception,	it	makes	perfect	sense.	On	my	reading,	the	phrase	 ‘clear	
and	distinct’	is	logically	similar	to	the	phrase	‘one	and	only’.	Being	one 
person	in	the	room	does	not	entail	being	the	only	person	in	the	room,	
but	we	could	say	the	same	thing	by	saying	that	you	are	the	‘one	person’,	
or	 the	 ‘only	 person’,	 or	 the	 ‘one	 and	 only	 person’	 in	 the	 room.	 This	
is	 because	 only-ness	 is	 not	 a	 property	 in	 its	 own	 right	 to	 be	 added	
to	one-ness:	it’s	just	the	condition	of	being	one	thing	in	the	absence	
of	—	separated	 from	—	anything	 else.	 Likewise,	 being	 clear	 does	 not	
entail	being	distinct,	but	Descartes	often	means	the	same	thing	by	say-
ing	that	a	perception	is	‘clear’,	or	that	it	is	‘distinct’,	or	that	it	is	‘clear	
and	distinct’.	That	is	because	distinctness	is	not	a	property	in	its	own	
right	to	be	added	to	clarity:	it’s	just	the	condition	of	being	clear	in	the	
absence	of	—	separated	from	—	anything	unclear.
Finally,	 remember	 that	while	a	completely	clear	perception	must	
contain	the	truth	and	only	the	truth,	given	the	Truth	Rule,	that	does	
not	mean	 it	 contains	 the	whole	 truth	 (AT	 7:220–1).	There	 is	always	
more	to	learn,	more	to	get	clear	on.
6. Conclusion
In	sum,	Descartes	is	committed	to	the	following	thesis:
Clarity First
•	Clarity	is	a	primitive, phenomenal	quality.
•	Clarity	is	definitionally	prior	to	these	other	properties:
ideas	of	sensible	things	[i.e.,	bodies]”	(2O/R, AT	7:130–1*).	Our	ideas	
of	thoughts	are	normally	“very	confused	and	mixed	up	with”	our	ideas	
of	bodies.	 In	one	remarkable	passage,	Descartes	says	 this	confusion	
even	interferes	with	our	apprehension	of	“the	proposition	‘I	am	think-
ing,	therefore	I	exist.’”	He	says	that	“your	imagination	insistently	mixes 
itself up	with	your	thoughts	and	lessens the clarity	of	this	apprehension	
by	trying	to	clothe	it	with	shapes”	(To	[Silhon],	March	or	April	1648,	
AT	5:136–7†*).	That	is	precisely	what	is	depicted	in	the	diagram	above.	
With	perceptions	of	the	foot	and	the	pain	“mixed	together”	in	this	way,	
the	obscurity	of	one	“lessens	the	clarity”	of	the	other.52
Interpreting	 distinctness	 as	 nothing	 other	 than	 complete	 clarity	
resolves	a	puzzle	in	Descartes’s	usage.	Recall	his	view	that	a	“percep-
tion	which	can	serve	as	the	basis	for	a	certain	and	indubitable	judge-
ment	 needs	 to	 be	 not merely clear but also distinct”	 (Pr.	 i.45).	 He	 also	
says	that	“a	perception	can	be	clear	without	being	distinct,	but	not	dis-
tinct	without	being	clear”	(Pr.	i.46).	Since	distinctness	entails	clarity,	it	
makes	sense	that	he	sometimes	uses	the	term	‘distinct’	by	itself	when	
he	means	 ‘clear	and	distinct’.	But	the	converse	doesn’t	hold	—	clarity	
doesn’t	entail	distinctness	—	and	yet	he	often	uses	the	term	‘clear’	by	
itself	when	he	means	‘clear	and	distinct’:
I	clearly	infer	that	God	also	exists.	…	So	clear	is	this	con-
clusion	that	I	am	confident	that	the	human	intellect	can-
not	know	anything	that	is	more	evident	or	more	certain.	
(M4,	AT	7:53†;	cf.	M5,	AT	7:65)
Sometimes	he	substitutes	‘clearly	and	distinctly’	with	‘clearly’:
Admittedly	my	nature	 is	such	 that	so	 long	as	 I	perceive	
something	 very	 clearly and distinctly	 I	 cannot	 but	
52.	 In	other	work	(Paul	2018)	I	examine	these	passages	in	more	detail	to	argue	
the	 following.	 The	 clear	 but	 confused	 “perception	 of	 pain”	 at	 issue	 is	 not	
sense-perception	but	an	intellectual	act	of	introspection,	which	is	why	it	can	
become clear	and	distinct	in	the	way	required	for	certainty.	The	way	it	becomes	
clear	and	distinct	is	through	radical	doubt,	i.e.	doubt	about	the	existence	of	all	
bodies,	including	one’s	own.	
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infallibly	true,	how	can	we	use them	to	apprehend	truths	if	we	can’t	be	
sure	which	of	our	perceptions	are	completely	clear?54
Whether	this	is	really	a	problem	depends	on	what	is	required	for	
apprehending	truths.	Some	commentators	assume	that	in	order	to	ap-
prehend	some	truth,	p,	it	wouldn’t	suffice	that	you	have	a	completely	
clear	perception	 that	 p — you	 further	have	 to	apprehend	 the	second-
order	truth	that	you	have	a	completely	clear	perception	that	p.55	Given	
the	present	assumption,	you	further	have	to	apprehend	the	third-order	
truth	that you	have	a	completely	clear	perception	that you	have	a	com-
pletely	clear	perception	that	p.	And	so	on,	ad	 infinitum.	 If	 this	were	
required,	 it	would	be	 impossible	 for	finite	minds	 like	ours	 to	appre-
hend	truths.
Fortunately,	Descartes	denies	that	apprehension	requires	any	such	
thing.	As	we	saw	in	§1,	he	holds	 that	having	a	completely	clear	per-
ception	that	p is	sufficient	for	apprehending	p.	It	follows	that	nothing	
further	 is	 required,	 including	 any	 act	 of	 higher-order	 apprehension	
or	 thought.	 When	 you	 perceive	 p	 with	 complete	 clarity,	 there	 is	 no	
room	 for	 doubt	 or	 deliberation,	 including	 higher-order	 deliberation.	
The	clarity	of	your	perception	compels	your	assent,	and	the	resulting	
judgement	just	is an	act	of	apprehension.	I	develop	this	point	in	other	
work,56	but	what	 I	want	 to	observe	here,	 in	closing,	 is	how	it	under-
scores	the	primacy	of	clarity	itself.	Since	clarity	is	primitive,	there	are	
no	independent	criteria	we	can	use	to	identify	clarity.	Nor	do	we	need	
any.	 To	 apprehend	 truths,	 we	 don’t	 need	 criteria	 for	 clarity.	 All	 we	
need	is	clarity.57
54.	 This	problem	was	raised	in	the	17th	century	by	Pierre	Gassendi	(see	LoLordo	
2005a;	2005b;	2006:	55–9)	and	Pierre-Daniel	Huet	(see	Lenon	2008:	cf.	5).	
For	another	treatment,	see	Humber	(1981).
55.	 Larmore	 (1984)	 articulates	 this	 assumption	 but	 doesn’t	 endorse	 it.	 Alanen	
(1999;	2003:	ch.	7)	does.
56.	 Paul	(forthcoming:	ch.	6).
57.	 I	am	especially	grateful	to	Colin	Chamberlain	for	his	 invaluable	comments	
on	multiple	drafts	of	this	material.	Special	thanks	also	to	Michael	Della	Roc-
ca,	Robert	Pasnau,	Marleen	Rozemond,	Alison	Simmons,	and	Tad	Schmaltz	
who	offered	generous	and	helpful	feedback.	I	am	also	grateful	for	insightful	
  •  Obscurity	is	the	absence	of	clarity.
  • Confusion	 is	 the	 condition	 whereby	 one	  
	 	 perception	 is	 fused	 with	 another	 in	 way	 that	  
  lessens its clarity.
  •  Distinctness	is	the	condition	whereby	a	clear		
	 	 perception	is	‘sharply	separated’	from	anything	 
	 	 obscure	so	that	it’s	completely clear.
We	 began	 by	 noting	 that	 clear	 and	 distinct	 perception	 is	 the	 center-
piece	of	Descartes’s	philosophy,	but	on	closer	 inspection	 it	 is	clarity,	
specifically,	which	stands	at	the	center.	Clarity	is	an	indefinable	quality	
in	terms	of	which	the	other	perceptual	qualities,	including	distinctness,	
are	defined.	
In	 other	 work,	 I	 elaborate	 on	 Descartes’s	 Clarity	 First	 thesis	 by	
showing	that,	in	his	view,	clarity	is	prior	in	a	different	way	—	not	defi-
nitionally	but	explanatorily	—	to	six	other	key	properties.	When	your	
perception	 is	 completely	 clear,	 its	 clarity	 explains	 why	 you	 have	 (i)	
a	conclusive	reason	for	assent	(belief,	 judgement), (ii)	 rational	 indu-
bitability,	(iii)	psychological	indubitability,	(iv)	spontaneity	(the	high-
est	grade	of	human	freedom),	(v)	infallibility,	and	(vi)	apprehension. 
These	 six	 properties	 are	 the	 goods	 that	 clarity	 provides.	 They	 flow	
from	the	very	nature	of	clarity,	from	the	phenomenally	distinctive	way	
in	which	a	clear	perception	presents	its	content	as	true	to	the	perceiv-
ing	subject.	Clarity	does	what	it	does	because	of	what	it	is.53
This	might	seem	to	make	it	all	the	more	urgent	to	ask:	How	can	we	
tell	whether	or	not	a	perception	is	completely	clear?	While	Descartes	
claims	 to	 have	 complete	 clarity	 on	 various	 matters,	 he	 also	 admits	
that	there	have	been	things	which	“through	habitual	belief	I thought 
I perceived clearly,	 although	 I	 did	 not	 in	 fact	 do	 so”	 (M3, AT	 7:35†;	 cf.	
AT	8A:21;	AT	8B:352;	AT	6:33).	This	raises	a	version	of	the	tradition-
al	problem	of	 the	criterion:	Even	if	completely	clear	perceptions	are	
53.	 Paul	(forthcoming:	chs.	4,	5,	6).
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